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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):  
The Compatibility with UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA 
Convention 
– the way forward in the East Asian region – 
 
Degree:      Master of Science in Maritime Affairs 
    (Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration) 
 
This dissertation examines the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a 
multilateral effort that aims to interdict shipments of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and related materials.  Given its flexibility as an “activity” rather than an 
organization, the initiative has gained supports from more than 90 countries since its 
interception in 2003.   
While the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP), the operational 
principles of the initiative, notes that the PSI activities are consistent with national 
legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, as the paper reveals, 
the SOP is not compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
1982 (UNCLOS).  
 The dissertation also provides critical reviews of the Protocol of 2005 to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, 1988 in the PSI perspectives.  The new Protocol has broadened the 
v 
range of offences to include criminalization of the transportation of WMD.  
Moreover, it has introduced boarding provisions which authorize states to board a 
foreign flagged vessel on the high seas.  These newly introduced provisions will 
enhance the legitimacy of the PSI operations, upon entering into force. 
 Further, the East Asian region, where one of the “proliferation concern 
states” is located, is focused.  The response of the states in the region to the PSI is 
carefully examined and the analysis leads that the states in the region are not willing 
to participate in the PSI, having reservation about the legitimacy of the initiative.  
The author concludes with suggestions that establishing a formal 
organization; strengthening the legality by introducing a new UN Security Council 
resolution; and expanding the outreach activities are the keys for the PSI to be a 
full-fledged regime so that it will acquire global support and be able to contribute 
towards international peace and security.   
 
KEYWORDS:      Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SOP), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
UNCLOS, 2005 SUA Convention, the East Asian region
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 9, 2002, two Spanish warships, under the request of the 
United States, stopped and boarded a North Korean cargo vessel flying no flag while 
it was crossing the Gulf of Aden, about 600miles southeast of the Yemen coast.1  
They found 15 scud missiles 2  under bags of cement.  According to U.S. 
administration officials, the vessel had been tracked by American intelligence “all the 
way out” from North Korea, however, they were not sure whether those missiles 
were bound for Yemen, some other nations in that region, or terrorist groups.3  
                                                 
1 Before boarding the So San, two Spanish navy vessels, the Navarra and the Patino fired 
warning shots across its bow as it tried to escape from them and, in the end, Spanish special force 
troops boarded by helicopter.  See Thom Shanker, "Threats and Responses: Arms Smuggling; 
Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea," The New York Times, December 11 2002. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE7DF153AF932A25751C1A9649C8B63. 
For the details of the So San incident see Ibid.; Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security 
Initiative; Making Waves in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2005), 35.; Thomas E. Ricks and Peter 
Slevin, "Spain and U.S. Seize N. Korean Missiles: Scuds Were on Ship Bound for Yemen," 
Washington Post, December 11 2002. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/527.html.; Joby 
Warrick, "On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory," Washington Post August 14, 
2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/.  
2 The scud missiles (400 miles range) are developed based on a Soviet-era design for a tactical 
surface-to-surface missile.  Although it does not have high accuracy, if it is equipped with 
chemical or biological weapons that do not require high accuracy, the causing effect is 
considerable.  See Shanker, note 1 above.  
According to Spanish Defense Minister, Federico Trillo, after the initial search, American 
explosives experts secured the missiles and finally found out that there were 15 complete scud 
missiles, with 15 conventional, high-explosive warheads and 23 tanks of nitric acid, and 85 
barrels of chemicals.  See David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "Threats and Responses: War 
Matériel; Reluctant U.S. Gives Assent for Missiles to Go to Yemen," The New York Times, 
December 12 2002. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01EFD91738F936A25755C0A9659C8B63&s
ec=&spon=&pagewanted=print. 
3 Benjamin Friedman, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The Legal Challenge," in the 
2 
However, when President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen told the United States that he 
had legally bought them for the defense of his country, U.S. officials had to release 
the vessel as the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, stated that “there is no 
provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of 
missiles from North Korea.”4  
The vessel was sailing without a flag and the identification marking was 
painted over, it appeared as a “lawless, stateless vessel.”5  Under Article 110 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, warships are 
justified to conduct “right of visit” to a vessel on the high seas if there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that “the ship is without nationality.”6  Yemen is a party to 
UNCLOS and North Korea is not, however, this provision is applicable to North 
Korea as well, since customary international law does apply to it in this case.7  
Therefore, the boarding by Spanish Navy can be justified.  
However, seizure of the cargo was questioned as neither North Korea nor 
Yemen has signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was 
intended to prevent the spread of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).8  Moreover, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen claimed that he had 
legally bought them for the defense of his country.  In the end, the trade of scud 
                                                                                                                                          
Bipartisan Security Group (2003). http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf. 
4 Sanger and Shanker, note 2 above.  
5 Shanker, note 1 above.  
6 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (hereinafter UNCLOS), Art. 110 
for other reasons for a ship to be boarded on the high seas: engaging in piracy, slave trade, 
unauthorized broadcasting, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship. Legal issues with respect to UNCLOS will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
7 See Michael Byers, "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative," The 
American Journal of International Law 98, no. 3 (2004). http://proquest.umi.com/. 
8 See Sanger and Shanker, note 2 above.  
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missiles between North Korea and Yemen was considered as “legal” and Fleischer 
had to comment that “While there is authority to stop and search, in this instance 
there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of scud missiles from North Korea to 
Yemen. And, therefore, the merchant vessel is being released.”9  Even though there 
are doubts of the vessel’s nationality, there is no legality to search WMD on board a 
vessel, likewise there are no laws prohibiting the transport of conventional arms.10 
 The So San incident clearly demonstrated that existing regimes did not have 
sufficient capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD.  However, a worldwide 
trend of counter-terrorism has been seeking some ways to prevent the spread of 
WMD and related materials to maintain international peace and security.  It was 
especially true for the United States where tragic terrorist attacks were brought about 
as realities on September 11, 2001.  Moreover, it has been a top priority on the 
agenda among the states in East Asia where one of the “proliferation concern states” 
is located.  The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the answer that the United 
States and like-minded countries has sought and it was announced in May 2003, in 
Krakow, Poland.  The PSI is a multilateral effort that aims to interdict the “transfer 
or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states 
and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”11 
 However, the initiative did not receive positive reaction from countries such 
as China and Russia in the East Asian region. They expressed reservations about 
                                                 
9 Kevin Drew, "Law Allows Search, but Does Not Address Seizure of Cargo,"  (2002), 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/11/missiles.legal/index.html. 
10 See Valencia, note 1 above.  
11 The White House, "Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security Initiative; Statement of Interdiction 
Principles," (hereinafter SOP) September 4, 2003,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/print/20030904-11.html. 
4 
legitimacy of the initiative under international law.  Without a global support of the 
initiative, the effectiveness of PSI activities will certainly be limited.  While the 
United States and like-minded states have been expanding the initiative, two 2005 
SUA Protocols were adopted in October 2005.  The Protocols, inter alia, have 
broadened the range of offences, and transportation of WMD and its related materials 
are criminalized.  Moreover, a boarding provision that will allow states to board a 
suspected vessel on the high seas, has been added.  These amendments, upon 
entering into force, are greatly expected to enhance PSI activities. 
 The following analysis aims to examine the controversial legal issues 
surrounding the PSI with respect to UNCLOS; critically review the 2005 SUA 
Convention and clarify what it implies for the PSI; and carefully review the reactions 
of the major countries of the East Asian region.  Through the analysis, this 
dissertation clarifies what modifications are needed for the PSI, so that it will be 
accepted in the East Asian region and the world.  For this aim, the dissertation 
proceeds in five chapters.  In Chapter 2, an overview of the development of the PSI 
is provided and analysis of the principles of the initiative clarifies what and whom it 
is actually targeting at.  Chapter 3 provides critical analysis of the PSI’s 
compatibility with UNCLOS.  The PSI’s legitimacy is analyzed under each 
applicable maritime zone with actual interdiction examples.  It further explains 
boarding agreements that the United States has been concluding with the major flags 
of registry countries.  Chapter 4 examines the 2005 SUA Convention in the PSI 
perspective.  An overview of the development of the Convention is provided and 
two key features of the new Convention in relation to the initiative are particularly 
5 
reviewed.  Further, implication of this new SUA Convention for the PSI is analyzed.  
Chapter 5 provides reviews how major countries in the East Asian region responded 
to the PSI and it clarifies issues what the countries are concerned about.  Finally, in 
Chapter 6, this dissertation concludes by providing suggestions hoping that the PSI, 
though the current structure is not ideal, will become a full-fledged regime so that it 
will be able to contribute toward international peace and security.
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CHAPTER 2.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE PSI  
2.1. The emergence of the PSI 
The release of the So San coincided with the United States’ issuance of the 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on December 11 which 
called for a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of WMD.  It set three 
principal pillars: Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use; Strengthened 
Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation; and Consequence Management to 
Respond to WMD Use.12  Having set such a National Strategy, it was noteworthy 
that the White House had to admit that there was no legal authority to interdict the 
found scud missiles.  The So San incident demonstrated the limits of 
counter-proliferation policy under conventional international law and, thus, it 
hastened the United States to formulate the new initiative with like-minded nations.  
On May 31, 2003, five months after the So San incident, President of the 
United States, George W. Bush, made a speech to the people of Poland at Wawel 
Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland.  In this speech, he showed a basic idea of stopping 
proliferation of WMD and announced a new approach to fight the proliferation of 
WMD called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  
 
                                                 
12 The United States, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 
2002 (Washington, DC). http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf.  
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When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, 
we must have the means and authority to seize them.  So today I 
announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation 
Security Initiative.  The United States and a number of our close allies, 
including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search 
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or 
missile technologies.  Over time, we will extend this partnership as 
broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons away 
from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies. 13 
 
PSI is a “global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.”14  
John Bolton, then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security, who was tasked to establish new responses to the So San incident, stated at 
the testimony before the House International Relations Committee, “Our goal is to 
work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation 
trade at sea, in the air and on land,” and he continued to say, “Over time, we will 
extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive 
weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our enemies.”15  According 
                                                 
13  George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,"  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html. 
14 Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "The Proliferation Security Initiative,"  
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/34726.htm. 
15 John R. Bolton, "U.S. Efforts to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Testimony 
before the House International Relations Committee," (June 4, 2003), 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/21247.htm. 
8 
to Bolton, the PSI’s goal is not only preventing the proliferation of WMD, but also 
“to eliminate or roll back such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that 
already possess them or are close to doing so.”16  
 
We believe that the existing system of national export control systems 
[and] multilateral export control agreements were not completely 
effective because there’s still a thriving black market in WMD 
components, technologies, and production materials. And what we 
wanted to do was to find more active ways of dealing with the ongoing 
trafficking in all of these WMD-related materials-not to replace the 
export control regimes, but to do something that would be more effective 
in handling all of this trafficking. And based on what we’ve seen with 
the So San interdiction [and] based on a variety of law enforcement and 
other operations that had been conducted, we felt there was a potential to 
have a multilateral agreement that would allow us to do that-to conduct 
interdiction of WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land.17  
 
On June 12, 2003, two weeks after George W. Bush’s announcement of the 
PSI to fight the proliferation of WMD, the first meeting of the PSI was held in 
Madrid, Spain.18  Participants in the meeting were Australia, France, Germany, Italy, 
                                                 
16 Ibid.  
17 Arms Control Association, "The New Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John 
Bolton," November 2003, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/2003/November/Bolton.asp. 
18 See note above 14.  
9 
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, which became a “core group” of the PSI.  In the first meeting, they agreed to 
assess existing national authorities whether they have such practical measures and to 
encourage the various export control regimes to incorporate with the PSI to 
strengthen those regimes.19  
 The second meeting was held in Brisbane, Australia on July 9-10, 2003, 
where the participants focused on “defining actions necessary to collectively or 
individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the 
air or on land.”20  The meeting also emphasized effective information sharing for 
interdiction, and agreed to “strengthen and improve capabilities for the exchange of 
information and analysis between participants as a basis for cooperative action to 
impede WMD and missile trade.”21  Moreover, the meeting agreed to have a series 
of interdiction training exercises, utilizing both military and civilian assets as 
appropriate.  
 Most significantly, a third PSI meeting was held on September 3-4, 2003 in 
Paris where the core group agreed to the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP) 
which identifies the “concrete actions to collectively or individually interdict 
shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials”22 and is, thus, 
                                                 
19 Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative: 
Chairman's Statement at the First Meeting of the PSI," June 12, 2003, Madrid, Spain, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/25382.htm. 
20 Bureau of Nonproliferation. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Statement at the 
Second Meeting of the PSI, July 9-10, 2003 " Brisbane, Australia, July 10, 2003, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/25377.htm. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Bureau of Nonproliferation. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Statement at the 
Third Meeting of the PSI, September 3-4, 2003," Paris, France, September 4, 2003, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/25425.htm. 
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considered as the principle of PSI activities.  Moreover, the participants affirmed 
that the PSI is consistent with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Presidential 
statement of 31 January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD 
threatens international peace and security, and emphasizes the need to prevent 
proliferation.  Moreover, they agreed that the PSI would be a good tool to 
implement it.23 
 
2.2. The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP)  
The SOP (See Appendix A for the full text of SOP) identifies specific steps 
for the effective interdiction of WMD, and was developed and published by the core 
group of the PSI on September 4, 2003: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
In the preamble of the four principles, it states; 
 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to 
establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to 
impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related 
materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant 
international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.24  
 
This is an important paragraph as it states all the principles of the PSI and 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 SOP (See note 11 above.) 
11 
that the participants activities are based on national legal authorities, relevant 
international law, and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.  The SOP is 
not establishing any new legal frameworks, rather it is a guideline which 
participating states are recommended to follow for the interdiction of WMD.  
 Paragraph 1 of the Principles states the PSI participants commit themselves 
to undertake effective measures for “interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, 
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors 
of proliferation concern.”25  Although it is not defining what “States or non-state 
actors of proliferation concern” are, it is generally referring to certain states or 
entities that are engaged in proliferation of WMD. (The issue surrounding “States or 
non-state actors of proliferation concern” will be further discussed in section 2.2.1 
below.) 
Paragraph 2 encourages PSI participants to adopt “streamlined procedures” 
for rapid information sharing concerning suspected proliferation activities. 26  
Moreover, participants are encouraged to dedicate appropriate resources and efforts 
to interdiction operations to maximize coordination of it.27  In paragraph 3, PSI 
participants commit themselves to review their relevant national legal authorities and 
international law and frameworks to strengthen them if it is necessary.28  
 Paragraph 4 provides specific actions to support the interdiction efforts of 
PSI participants.29  This paragraph is important to note for the following discussion 
                                                 
25 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
26 Ibid., paragraph 2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
29 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
12 
in this paper that all the specific actions indicated in this paragraph should be taken 
“to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their 
obligations under international law and frameworks.”30 
 Paragraph 4-a asks PSI participants “Not to transport or assist in the 
transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern” and it also requests them “not to allow any persons subject to their 
jurisdiction to do so.” 31   This sub-paragraph shows that PSI includes the 
transportation of WMD both “to” and “from” the states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern.  
 In paragraph 4-b, PSI participants, at their own initiative or at the request 
and good cause shown by another state, should “take action to board and search any 
vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the 
territorial sea of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize 
such cargoes that are identified.”32  This sub-paragraph reflects the present status of 
flag state jurisdiction under UNCLOS that if a vessel which is flying its flag of 
nationality is “reasonably” suspected, the flag state is expected to board and search 
the vessel for the interdiction of WMD.  
 Paragraph 4-c envisions the case when flag states can not exercise their 
jurisdiction.  Under those situations, PSI participants are encouraged to “seriously 
consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., paragraph 4-a. 
32 Ibid., paragraph 4-b. 
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searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such 
WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.”33  As it 
is anticipated that those transportations are conducted where a flag state authority can 
not reach in time, this paragraph encourages flag state to allow other PSI participants 
who can reach the place in time to board and search the vessels on their behalf. 
(Boarding agreement will be further discussed in section 3.7.) 
 Paragraph 4-d commits PSI participants to take appropriate actions to “(1) 
stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when 
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from 
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are 
identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, 
internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and 
seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.”34   Although the actions taken under 
paragraphs 4-b and 4-c are based on flag state jurisdiction, the actions stated in this 
paragraph are under coastal state jurisdiction.  
 Paragraph 4-e considers the case conducted by aircraft.  PSI participants, at 
their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, 
should take actions to “(a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying 
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are 
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are 
identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes 
                                                 
33 Ibid., paragraph 4-c. 
34 Ibid., paragraph 4-d. 
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transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.”35 
 Although it has been dealing with the transportation of WMD up to the 
previous paragraph, paragraph 4-f deals with the transshipment points for those 
cargos.  “If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points 
for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected 
of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.”36 
 As has been seen, the SOP is not establishing any new legal frameworks and 
the PSI is not a separate approach to counter proliferation, rather it is an operational 
mechanism which PSI participants are recommended to follow under the existing 
national legal authority and relevant international law and frameworks to constrain 
the flow of WMD.  
 
2.2.1. “States and non-state actors of proliferation concern” 
In the preamble of the SOP, it states, “PSI participants are committed to the 
following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis 
through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related 
materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”37  
As briefly touched upon in the previous section, when “states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern” is mentioned in the SOP, it is not clear what states fall under 
that category.  In paragraph 1 of the SOP, it states; 
                                                 
35 Ibid., paragraph 4-e. 
36 Ibid., paragraph 4-f. 
37 Ibid., preamble. 
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“States or non-state actors of proliferation concern” generally refers to 
those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish 
should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in 
proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) 
transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their 
delivery systems, or related materials.38 (Italics added for emphasis) 
 
In the second PSI meeting held in July 9-10, 2003 in Brisbane, Australia, the 
Chairman’s Statement notes that “states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern” referred to North Korea and Iran.39 Bolton also explains, “North Korea, 
Iran, and Syria, among others, are clearly states of proliferation concern.”40 However, 
at the same time, he states that the PSI efforts are not directed at any one country, but, 
instead, at would-be proliferators to halt the worldwide trafficking in WMD, delivery 
systems, and related materials.41 
 India, Israel, and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and have stayed outside 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and 
                                                 
38 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
39 See Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 20 above. 
40 John R. Bolton, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Vision Becomes Reality: Remarks to 
the First Anniversary Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative," Krakow, Poland, May 31, 
2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33046.htm.; Bolton, "Stopping the Spread of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative," 
Tokyo, Japan, October 27, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm.  
41  Bolton, "Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific 
Region”(See note 40 above.); Bolton, "Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction 
Principles, Remarks at Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting," Paris, France, September 4, 
2003, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm.  
16 
prevents all of its states-parties except China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States from owning nuclear weapons.42  In the interview held in 
November 2003, Bolton responded to a question about the shipments of 
WMD-related goods to India, Israel, and Pakistan; 
 
There are unquestionably states that are not within existing treaty 
regimes that possess weapons of mass destruction legitimately. We’re 
not trying to have a policy that attempts to cover each and every one of 
those circumstances. What we’re worried about are the rogue states and 
the terrorist groups that pose the most immediate threat.”43 
 
It can be said that the emphasis of the PSI is on “bad actors” rather than “bad 
weapons.”44  
 Although it might receive criticisms, saying that the term “states and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern” is not clear, on the other hand, there is also 
a positive notion that the term provides flexibility and allows PSI participants to 
decide at the time of interdiction depending on the situation.  For example, some 
                                                 
42 See Wade Boese, "Proliferation Security Initiative: A Piece of the Arms Control Puzzle," 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 2005, 63. 
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/2003/November/Bolton.asp. 
43 Arms Control Association, note 17 above.  
44 Boese, note 42 above, at 63.  See also Mark J Valencia, "Unsettling Asia for Security's Sake," 
Far Eastern Economic Review 168, no. 3 (2005), 57. http://proquest.umi.com/.  On the contrary, 
Dhanapala, then-Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, stated 
that “[t]hey are not dangerous simply when located inside so-called ‘rogue states.’  They are 
dangerous everywhere and always,” and he emphasized the importance of multilateral treaty 
regime such as BWC, CWC, and NPT.  See Jayantha Dhanapala, "Multilateral Approaches to 
WMD Threats after September 11," Speech given at Annual Luncheon of the Arms Control 
Association, Washington, D.C., January 22, 2002, 
http://disarmament.un.org/speech/22jan2002.htm 
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years ago, Libya would probably be one of the actors of “proliferation concern”, 
however, it may not be considered to poses an “immediate threat” to the world today 
since Libya decided to abandon WMD programs following the BBC China 
incident.45 (BBC China incident will be discussed in Chapter 3) 
 
2.2.2. What are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)? 
In the SOP and other official statements regarding the PSI, Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) is a term used interchangeably with nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons, and is not defined.  It does not, even, refer to any specific 
international conventions governing the possession of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons and the spread of missile technology.46  The U.S. Code provides 
the definition of WMD under Section 2303, Chapter 40: Defense Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Title 50: War and National Defense;  
 
The term “weapon of mass destruction” means any weapon or device 
that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to a significant number of people through the release, 
dissemination, or impact of –  
(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;  
(B) a disease organism; or  
                                                 
45 See Andrew C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction," 
The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2005): 133-38. 
http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_winner.pdf. 
46 See Jofi Joseph, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?," 
Arms Control Today 34, no. 5 (2004): 8. 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Joseph.asp?print. 
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(C) radiation or radioactivity.47 
 
However, this definition does not apply to the SOP, and when the term 
WMD is used in the SOP or official statement of the PSI activity, it can be 
considered to refer to the general terms of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
 There are also critics that indicate a lack of definition of the term “related 
materials,”48 saying that “while WMD and delivery systems can be defined in 
general terms, the same does not apply for ‘related materials’,”49 because more 
precise control is required for dual-use (civilian/military) materials to prohibit 
individuals from transporting them.  By not providing a definition, PSI participants 
may maintain flexibility of the shipment of dual-use materials that are applicable, for 
example, to both chemical weapons and civilian use depending on their final 
destination.50  The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted April 28, 
2004, gives a definition for “related materials” although this applies only for this 
resolution, not for the SOP or other official statement of the PSI activity: 
 
Materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral 
treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which 
could be used for the design development, production or use of nuclear, 
                                                 
47 The U.S. Code. Section 2303: Definition; Chapter 40: Defense against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Title 50: War and National Defense.  
48 See Joseph, note 46 above.; Christer Ahlström, "PSI International Law Aspects of the 
Statement of Interdiction Principles," in SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security, ed. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 758. http://yearbook2005.sipri.org/ch18/ch18. 
49 Ahlström, note 48 above, at 759.  
50 Joseph, note 46 above, at 9.  
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chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.51 
 
2.3. UN Security Council Resolution 1540  
The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted on April 28, 2004 at 
its 4956th meeting. The Resolution calls upon all States,  
 
in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and 
consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent 
illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means 
of delivery, and related materials.52 (Italics added for emphasis) 
 
It requests states to develop effective measures, rules, and regulations to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD.  The United States considers that the PSI and the SOP 
identify the steps that can produce the kind of cooperation which is called for in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 and, therefore, the Resolution and the PSI activity 
are considered as “mutually reinforcing and are legally and political compatible.”53  
The Chairman’s Statement at the 1st Anniversary PSI meeting held on May 31-June1, 
2004 also notes that the PSI is consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 
1540.54  This resolution was proposed by the United States, as in President Bush’s 
                                                 
51  United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1540 (2004). 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement 
52 Ibid.  
53 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation, "Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security 
Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)," Washington, DC, May 26, 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/46839.htm.  
54 Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "Chairman's Statement at the 1st 
Anniversary PSI Meeting, May 31-June1, 2004 " Krakow, Poland, June 1, 2004, 
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address to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2003, to criminalize the 
proliferation of weapons. 
  
Because proliferators will use any route or channel that is open to them, 
we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop them.  Today, I ask 
the U.N. Security Council to adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution. 
This resolution should call on all members of the U.N. to criminalize the 
proliferation of weapons -- weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict 
export controls consistent with international standards, and to secure any 
and all sensitive materials within their own borders.55 (Italics added for 
emphasis) 
 
However, the set Resolution does not contain any phrases that criminalize 
the proliferation of WMD.  Moreover, in a draft resolution, it contained the explicit 
word “interdict,” however, the phrase “take cooperative action to prevent illicit 
trafficking” was introduced in its place from March 24, 2004 after China’s objections, 
the last of the five permanent members of the Security Council to agree to the draft 
resolution.56  Nevertheless, this resolution can be a supportive mechanism for states 
to develop effective measures, rules, and regulations to prevent the proliferation of 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/33208.htm. 
55 United Nations, "Statement by His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush, President of the United 
States of America: Address to the United Nations General Assembly," September 23, 2003, 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/usaeng030923.htm. 
56 See Merav Datan, "Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD and Non-State Trafficking," 
Disarmament Diplomacy April/May 2005, no. 79 (2005). 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79md.htm/. 
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WMD as well as operating the PSI activities. 
  
2.4. Participation in the PSI  
According to the U.S. Department of State, as of May 22, 2008, 91 countries 
are participating in the PSI.57 (See Appendix B for the list of PSI participants) The 
Chairman’s Statement at the Fifth Meeting held on March 4-5, 2004 in Lisbon, 
Portugal, provides practical steps that can establish the basis for involvement in PSI 
activities as following: 
 
- Formally commit to and publicly endorse the PSI and its Statement of 
Interdiction Principles and indicate willingness to take all steps 
available to support PSI efforts.  
- Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal 
authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air or on land. 
Indicate willingness to strengthen authorities where appropriate. 
- Identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts 
(e.g. information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets). 
- Provide points of contact for PSI interdiction requests and other 
operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government 
processes to coordinate PSI response efforts. 
- Be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises 
and actual operations as opportunities arise. 
                                                 
57  Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, 
“Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm/. 
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- Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g. boarding 
agreements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation 
with PSI efforts (e.g. MOU on overflight denial).58 (Italics added for 
emphasis) 
 
Although many of the steps stated in the above contain the word “willing” 
as indicated in italics, it is not clear how states show their “willingness.”  States 
have not adopted any legally binding documents or drafted a charter to define its 
scope and mandate, but only follow the SOP.59  Based on the SOP, the PSI 
participants are expected to share intelligence, enhance the cooperation of military 
and law enforcement agencies on a global basis to interdict trafficking in WMD, 
delivery systems, and related materials60, however, there is no obligation.  The 
nature of the PSI is, thus, often described as “an activity, not an organization.” John 
Bolton, then-U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, 
stated at the Press Conference at the 1st anniversary meeting of the PSI held on June 
1, 2004 in Krakow, Poland: 
 
…it’s an activity, not an organization. It has no Director General, it has 
no Headquarters, it has no Secretariat, it has no budget.  It’s a question 
                                                 
58 Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative: 
Chairman's Statement at the Fifth Meeting of the PSI, March 4-5, 2004," Lisbon, Portugal, March 
5, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/30960.htm. 
59 See Joseph, note 46 above, at 8.  
60 John R. Bolton, "International Security Issues, Arms Control Matters, and Nonproliferation: 
Press Conference at U.S. Embassy Beijing," Beijing, China, February 16, 2004, 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/29723.htm. 
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of the participating nations cooperating in a variety of ways when the 
occasion arises.  If you say it’s an activity, not an organization long 
enough all kinds of things become clear.61 
 
This notion that the PSI is “an activity, not an organization” might give 
advantages for states to participate in the meetings or exercises as observers who 
want to keep a certain distance from the PSI coalition.  However, there are 
disadvantages that no states can check the participants’ seriousness and commitments 
and, moreover, the PSI’s sustainability can be questioned.62  
 
2.5. Operational expert meetings and exercises  
The main activity of the PSI is its operational exercises that involve military 
and law enforcement agencies.  Just one week after the announcement of the SOP, 
the first interdiction exercise, called “PACIFIC PROTECTOR” was conducted in the 
Coral Sea of Australia on September 10-13, 2003.  It was hosted by Australia, with 
France, Japan, and the United States participating.63  As of August 2008, more than 
30 exercises had been conducted at sea, in the air, and on land, and more than 20 
operational expert meetings had been held.64 (This means more than 6 exercises and 
4 operational expert meetings per year on average since the announcement of the 
                                                 
61 Bolton, "Press Conference on the Proliferation Security Initiative," Krakow, Poland, May 31, 
2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33556.htm.  
62 See Mary Beth Nikitin, "CRS Report for Congress: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) " 
February 4, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf. 
63 Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 14 above. See also Australian Government Department of 
Defence, "Proliferation Security Initiative,"  http://www.defence.gov.au/PSI/default.htm. 
64 Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 14 above.  
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SOP.  See Appendix C for the Proliferation Security Initiative Meetings and 
Exercises.)  Those exercises are discussed and planned through the operational 
experts meetings.  It can be said that there are two purposes for the exercises: to 
build the participants capabilities for cooperation and to show their activities in the 
public for discouraging would-be proliferators from their action.65 
                                                 
65 See Arms Control Association, "The Proliferation Security Initiative at a Glance," June 2004, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp.; Boese, note 42 above, at 62-63.  There is an 
opinion that providing “evidence to the public of a genuine political commitment” is also one of 
the purposes of the exercises. See Winner, note 45 above, at 134.  
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CHAPTER 3.  COMPATIBILITY WITH UNCLOS  
The PSI participants are encouraged to commit the SOP to prevent the 
shipment of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, “consistent with national legal 
authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.”66  The PSI does not 
provide any new legal power to the PSI participants, however, every PSI activity 
must be conducted under the existing national and international laws and regimes.  
Nevertheless, the compatibility between the PSI and UNCLOS has been a 
controversial issue since its establishment.   
 In this Chapter, the compatibility of the PSI with UNCLOS will be 
examined with actual interdiction examples under each applicable maritime zone: 
internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, straits used for international 
navigations, archipelagic seas, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the high seas. 
Through this process, this paper will clarify problematic issues within the SOP when 
practiced alongside UNCLOS.  Then, it will also discuss why the United States is 
rushing to make boarding agreements with the major flags of registry countries such 
as Panama and Liberia despite criticism from scholars as described below. 
 
3.1. Internal Waters  
                                                 
66 SOP (See note 11 above.) 
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In internal waters, the coastal state enjoys its full territorial sovereignty67 and, 
therefore, the right of innocent passage which exists in the territorial sea does not 
apply.68  Thus, as long as a suspected vessel stays in the port of the coastal state, the 
coastal state is free to board, search, and seize its cargoes if the cargoes are against 
the domestic laws.  If the cargo is seized, it usually becomes a matter of a civil 
lawsuit.69  The coastal states sovereignty provides legality for the PSI activities 
stated in Paragraph 4(f) of the SOP that require coastal states “to inspect vessels, 
aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, 
and to seize such cargoes that are identified” in their ports, airfields, or other 
facilities.70 
 
3.1.1. The Ku Wol San incident   
On June 25, 1999, the North Korean vessel Ku Wol San was suspected of 
transporting spare parts that are used for making missiles and atomic reactors to 
Pakistan, and was detained at Kandla port in Gujarat, India.71  The Indian port 
authority searched the vessel and, while doing so, the crew turned violent with the 
result that all 44 crew members were arrested.72  Indian officials found the vessel 
                                                 
67 UNCLOS, Article 2. 
68 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999), 61.  
69 Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, "Sailing into Uncharted Waters?: The Proliferation Security 
Initiative and the Law of the Sea," in BASIC Research Report (BRITISH AMERICAN 
SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, 2004), 46. 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm.  
70 SOP, paragraph 4(f).  
71 See Yann-Huei Song, "The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, 
Implementation, and an Assessment," Ocean Development & International Law 38 (2007): 
119-20.; Persbo and Davis, note 69 above, at 47.; Warrick, note 1 above. 
72 See Persbo and Davis, note 69 above, at 47.  
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was carrying components, testing equipment, and blue prints for the manufacture of 
Scud-type missiles, and had a falsely made cargo manifest.  
 Carrying military cargo to a third country, in this case to Pakistan, does not 
constitute any offence under Customs law of India if there is a proper declaration for 
the shipment, however, the faulty cargo manifest was a criminal offence. 73  
Therefore, the Indian authority’s action was compatible with the Article 2 of 
UNCLOS; the coastal states have full sovereignty in internal waters.  The search 
conducted at an Indian port against a foreign flagged vessel, North Korea, without 
consent of the flag state was legal.  The vessel was released three months later, in 
September, and the Indian authority explained that no charges would be imposed but 
provided no explanation as to why not.74   
 
3.1.2. The BBC China incident 
In late September 2003, the United States and U.K. intelligence services 
found that the BBC China, a German flagged vessel owned by a German company, 
was carrying thousands of centrifuge parts, equipment to enrich uranium, and en 
route to Libya.75  They informed the German government and accordingly, in early 
October, the German authorities contacted the shipowner. The shipowner was asked 
                                                 
73 Persbo and Davis, note 69 above, at 48.  
74 Ibid.; Andreas Persbo, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Dead in the Water or Steaming 
Ahead?," BASIC NOTES, 12 December 2003, 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN031212.htm, (March 1, 2008). 
75 See Barry Schweid, "U.S. Nabbed Libya Nuke Parts," CBS NEWS  (January 1, 2004), 
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for Nonproliferation Studies, "Proliferation Security Initiative: Libyan Case Crowns First Year's 
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to divert the vessel’s route to the port of Taranto, southern Italy, where the vessel was 
searched.  Centrifuge components were found that were not listed in the cargo 
manifest, and, therefore, confiscated.  The shipowner of the BBC China voluntarily 
diverted her route to Italy and, thus the stop, search and seizure happened in port, in 
internal waters.  Therefore, the seizure of parts of centrifuge was legal as of the 
vessel’s faulty manifest and the location of seizure was in port where the coastal state 
could exercise full sovereignty.76 
 After the incident, the United States and U.K. authorities were allowed to 
inspect laboratories and factories for manufacturing weapons in Libya.77  Then, on 
December 19, 2003, Muammar Qadhafi, Libya’s leader, announced that Libya would 
eliminate all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon programmes.78  Therefore, 
this incident has been repeatedly quoted by U.S. officials as a successful PSI 
interdiction example because it is considered that the interdiction of the BBC China 
shipment led to Libya giving up its WMD programmes.  For example, John Bolton, 
then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
stated, “Exposure of the A.Q. Khan network this past year - helped along by the PSI 
interdiction of nuclear materials aboard the BBC China and the subsequent decision 
of Libya to forego its nuclear and other WMD programs - has brought to light the 
breadth of the shadowy trading network in WMD.”79  
However, it seems unclear whether Libya’s decision to give up the WMD 
                                                 
76 See Song, note 71 above, at 121.  
77 See James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, note 75 above, at 25.; Wright, note 75 
above.  
78 See James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, note 75 above, at 25.; Wright, note 75 
above.  
79 Bolton, note 40 above.  
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programme was actually attributed to the BBC China’s interdiction.80  John Wolf, 
who served as an assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation from 2001 to 2004, 
states that the interdiction of the BBC China was “separate” from PSI and Libya’s 
decision was attributed to the previous efforts to track and uncover the Khan 
network.81  Moreover, a foreign official was quoted as saying “The BBC China 
operation was carried out in the spirit of PSI, but it was not a PSI operation.”82  
Winner has listed up possible reasons for Libya’s decision in addition to the incident: 
UN-imposed sanctions in the wake of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing; the 2003 war in 
Iraq; and the ongoing quiet diplomacy started during the Clinton administration by 
the United States and the U.K.83 
 
3.2. Territorial sea  
A coastal state also enjoys its sovereignty beyond its land territory and 
internal waters to “an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea” that does 
not exceed 12 nautical miles.84  However, a coastal states’ sovereignty is limited 
compared to the sovereignty over its land territory.  Article 17 of UNCLOS gives 
“right of innocent passage” to ships of all states and, under Article 24, the coastal 
states must not infringe the innocent passage of foreign vessel through the territorial 
sea.85  Passage is deemed innocent, under Article 19 (1), as long as it is “not 
                                                 
80 Wade Boese, "Key U.S. Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented," Arms Control Today 35, 
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81 See Boese, note 80 above, at 25.  
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prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal States.”86  Passage 
becomes prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal states under 
Article 19 (2) if the vessel is engaged in the following activities: 
 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any 
other manner in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of 
the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or 
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any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.87 
 
With this exhaustive list, however, transportation of WMD and the related 
material are not included. 88   Even, Article 23 explicitly allows “foreign 
nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or 
noxious substances” to conduct innocent passage through the territorial sea as long as 
they carry documents and take special precautionary measures that are 
internationally agreed.89  This article is said to be a U.S.-led compromise with the 
nations that wanted the Convention to state explicitly carriage of nuclear weapons in 
foreign territorial seas to be non-innocent.90  Therefore, transportation of WMD and 
the related materials in territorial seas are not deemed illegal activities under 
UNCLOS.  
 On the other hand, Song discusses that it is reasonable to assume that WMD 
or the related materials will not be used for peaceful purposes, therefore, the right of 
innocent passage is lost.91  The author notes that the carriage and transportation of 
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WMD or the related materials fit into the provisions that is prejudicial to the “peace, 
good order or security” given in Article 19 (2)-(a), “the threat or use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state, or 
in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations.”92  Moreover, under Article 301, when exercising 
the right of innocent passage, the vessel has to “refrain from any threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”93  
Therefore, Song concludes, it is considered to be legal for coastal states to exercise 
interdiction action against foreign-flagged vessels in their territorial seas if the vessel 
is transporting WMD or the related materials.   
 However, in this case, it is necessary for the coastal state to have national 
legislation that criminalize transportation of WMD and the related materials in its 
territorial sea by stating that the vessel is threatening its “peace, good order or 
security of the coastal States.”  Under Article 21, the coastal state may adopt laws 
and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea with respect to, 
for example, “the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic”, “the 
protection of navigational aids and facilities”, “the preservation of the environment 
of the coastal State”, and “the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws.”94  Although it is not explicitly stated in the given list 
under Article 21 whether coastal states can adopt laws and regulations regarding the 
transportation of WMD and the related materials, it might be possible for coastal 
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states to adopt national laws and regulations that prohibit the transportation of WMD 
and the related materials in its territorial sea if the coastal state makes certain relation 
to the list given under Article 21 for the transportation of WMD and the related 
materials.  
 However, under Article 32, warships and other government ships operated 
for non-commercial purposes are protected by immunities.95  Thus, when New 
Zealand denied U.S. warships to enter its ports in 1985, the United States argued that 
it was a violation of sovereign immunity.96  At that time, New Zealand demanded 
U.S. warships to assure them that there were no nuclear weapons on board, however, 
the United States replied that it did not confirm nor deny the presence or absence of 
nuclear weapons on board.97  
 Moreover, under Article 24 (1)-(b), those new laws and regulations should 
not be discriminatory against the vessels of any states or against vessels carrying 
cargoes to, from or on behalf of any states.98  These notions clearly show the 
difficulties of coastal states to adopt national laws and regulations that prohibit the 
transportation of WMD and the related materials in its territorial sea as it would 
contradict the immunity of warships that carry WMD.  Also, it should not be 
possible to adopt such regulations and laws while the United States itself sends its 
nuclear-powered warships or warships which carry nuclear weapons through out the 
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world as this would cause a double standard.99 
 Therefore, although coastal states are encouraged to take appropriate action 
to stop, search, and seize a vessel if it is reasonably suspected of carrying WMD or 
the related materials in paragraph 4-d of the SOP, it is illegal for the coastal state to 
do so.100  Coastal states cannot simply stop, search, and seize WMD or the related 
materials in territorial seas just because the vessel in question is carrying them.  
Therefore, the PSI activities encouraged in the SOP in the territorial sea are not 
compatible with UNCLOS. 
 
3.2.1. The Baltic Sky incident   
On June 22, 2003, the Baltic Sky, flying the Comoros flag, was stopped and 
searched by the Greek coast guard in its territorial sea while it was drifting in the 
Mediterranean.101  The Greek authorities had been tracking the vessel for five days 
before their investigation and they, naturally, wanted to know what the vessel was 
doing between Turkey and Greece.  On board, the authorities discovered about 680 
tonnes of explosives and 8,000 detonators.  The vessel’s documents showed that the 
cargo was destined for a company in Sudan, however, the address was proved to be a 
post office and the company did not exist.  The captain and crew, seven in total, 
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were charged with the illegal possession and transportation of explosives, moreover, 
they were charged with failing to notify the Greek authorities 24 hours prior to their 
transportation of explosives into Greek waters.102 
 While carrying explosives on board a cargo vessel is itself legal and not that 
unusual, the action taken by the Greek authorities against the Baltic Sky was also 
legal, under its domestic law, because the vessel was found to have faulty documents 
and it had failed to notify the Greeks of the explosives 24 hours prior to its 
transportation into Greek waters as required under its domestic law. 
 
3.3. Contiguous Zone 
The contiguous zone is an adjacent sea area to the territorial sea which “may 
not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.”103  In the contiguous zone, under Article 33 (1) of 
UNCLOS, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to: 
 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea.104 
 
Therefore, in the contiguous zone, the coastal state jurisdiction is limited 
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compared to the territorial sea and it can only exercise enforcement jurisdiction with 
respect to “customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary” laws and regulations that would 
occur in territory or territorial sea, not any offences made within the contiguous zone 
itself.105  In order to stop, search, and seize a vessel which is suspected of carrying 
WMD and the related materials in contiguous zone, the coastal state must have laws 
and regulations that show that the carriage and transportation of WMD and the 
related materials are infringing the coastal state’s customs law.106  In addition to 
these laws and regulations, the vessel needs to navigate towards the coastal state or 
depart from the coastal state so that the coastal state can stop, search, and seize the 
cargo.107  As in the case of illegal drug trafficking by vessels, if there were such 
laws and regulations for WMD interdiction in relation to customs, it would seem 
possible to intercept the cargo in the contiguous zone.  However, as previously 
explained, there are difficulties to prohibit the transportation of WMD and the related 
materials as this would contradict to Articles 19, 23, 24, and 32 of UNLOS.  
Therefore, it is illegal for the coastal state to stop, search, and seize vessels which are 
navigating in its contiguous zone because the carriage and transportation of WMD 
and the related materials do not fall under any of the “customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations” which coastal states may exercise the control of. 
 
3.4. Straits Used for International Navigation and Archipelagic seas 
Under Article 38 of UNCLOS, all ships enjoy the right of transit passage in 
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straits.108  In the same article, “transit passage” is defined as “the exercise in 
accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the 
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone”109  While ships can enjoy right of transit passage in 
straits, they are, at the same time, given duties when exercising it.  Under Article 39 
(1) and (2), when exercising the right of transit passage, ships have to satisfy the 
following criteria: 
 
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait; 
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any other 
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations; 
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of 
continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure 
or by distress; 
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part; 
(e) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
practices for safety at sea, including the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea; 
(f) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
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practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.110 
 
If the right of transit passage cannot be exercised in those straits used for 
international navigation, under Article 45, the right of innocent passage applies 
instead.111  As is the case for the right of innocent passage, the transportation of 
WMD and the related materials does not fall under the activities that are “prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State” regulated in Article 19 (2).  
There are also difficulties for states to identify whether the transportation of WMD 
and the related materials would fall under Article 39 (1) and (2).112  Because, for 
example, components of WMD could have a dual-use, either military use or 
commercial use, it can not always be determined if there is a threat to littoral 
states.113  Therefore, it is legally difficult for states to stop, search, and seize WMD 
or the related materials in those straits used for international navigation. 
 In archipelagic seas, sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends, under 
Article 49, to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance 
with Article 47.  On the other hand, under Article 52, ships of all states enjoy the 
same ‘right of innocent passage’ as they enjoy in the territorial sea.  The 
archipelagic state, however, may suspend temporarily the innocent passage of foreign 
ships “if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security.”114  This 
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suspension will take effect only after it is duly published.115  Under Article 53, an 
archipelagic state may designate sea lanes and air routes “suitable for the continuous 
and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic 
waters and the adjacent territorial sea.”116  
The right of innocent passage in archipelagic seas must be in accordance with 
Part II, section 3 of UNCLOS which regulates innocent passage in the territorial 
sea.117  Therefore, just as in the territorial sea, if a state wants to stop, search, or 
seize a vessel which is carrying and transporting WMD and the related materials, the 
state has to have its reasoning under Article 19 (2) noting that the passage is 
“prejudicial to the peace, good order or security” of the coastal state. However, as 
previously explained, the transportation of WMD and the related material are not 
included in the list of Article 19 (2).  Thus, again, states cannot legally stop, search, 
and seize WMD or the related materials in archipelagic seas just because the vessel 
in question is carrying them.  Therefore, the PSI activities encouraged in the SOP 
are not compatible with UNCLOS in archipelagic seas. 
 
3.5. Exclusive Economic Zone 
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea.118  The EEZ cannot extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In the EEZ the 
coastal state has sovereign rights over living and non-living natural resources.  
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Moreover, the coastal state can exercise jurisdiction with respect to: 
 
(a) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(b) marine scientific research; 
(c) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.119 
 
The EEZ is particularly designed for economic benefits such as fishing and 
oil mining that the coastal state’s can enjoy.  However, when the coastal state 
exercises its rights and duties in the EEZ, it must have “due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States” and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of 
UNCLOS.120  
When it comes to the interdiction of WMD, it seems that the coastal state 
lacks good reasoning.  The coastal state might try to conduct interdiction of WMD 
as stating it is for “the protection and preservation of the marine environment,” 
however, unless the vessel is actually polluting the ocean, it would not be likely to 
have sufficient justification.121  Under Article 211 (5), coastal states may “adopt 
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
vessels” in the EEZ, however, only when there are clear grounds for believing that a 
vessel may commit “substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution 
of the marine environment”, may the coastal state conduct a physical inspection of 
the vessel.122  Accordingly, the coastal state can not legally stop, search, and seize a 
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vessel which is carrying and transporting WMD and the related materials in the 
EEZ.123  
 
3.6. High Seas 
The High Seas are “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic states.”124  Under Article 87, all states enjoy 
“freedom of the high seas” and that includes the “freedom of navigation.”125  While 
ships are enjoying their freedom of navigation on the high seas, they have to have 
nationality and fly the flag of their nationality.126  On the high seas, ships are subject 
to the flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction.127  Thus, only the flag state of the vessel 
has jurisdiction over that vessel.  However, under Article 110, warships are justified 
to conduct “right of visit” if there is reasonable ground for suspecting the following 
items: 
 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of 
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the warship has jurisdiction under article 109; 
(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.128 
 
Accordingly, as long as there are the justifications above, warships can visit 
a ‘foreign-flagged’ vessel.  This is an exception of flag state exclusive jurisdiction 
regulated under Article 92.129  However, the conditions given under Article 110 do 
not include the carriage and transportation of WMD or the related materials.  
Therefore, even if a state ‘A’ receives intelligence reports that a vessel of flag state 
‘B’ is conducting the transportation of WMD and the related materials on the high 
seas, a warship of state ‘A’ does not have the justification to stop and visit the vessel.  
Only a warship of state ‘B’ can conduct a right of visit to the vessel as a flag state.  
In the case of the So San incident, it was navigating without a flag and its 
identification marking was painted over, it was a “lawless, stateless vessel.”130  
Hence, the boarding conducted by the Spanish Navy was justified under Article 110 
(1)-(d).131  However, they could not seize the scud missiles as there was no legal 
ground to seize them.  
The PSI has been set up through a U.S. initiative following this So San 
incident.  Still, it does not provide new legal authority to the United States and other 
participating states, and interdiction operations must be made under international law.  
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It is still not allowed for the PSI participants to stop, search, and seize WMD or 
related material on the high seas just because vessels are transporting them.  The 
PSI activities must follow flag state jurisdiction.  Hence, paragraph 4 (d) of the SOP 
confines states’ interdiction activities to their own flag on the high seas. 
 
At their own initiative or at the request and good cause shown by another 
state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their 
internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any 
other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or 
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such 
cargoes that are identified.132 (Italic added by author for emphasis) 
 
 If the state ‘A’ makes an agreement with state ‘B’, state ‘A’ can take specific 
action on a vessel from the flag of state ‘B’ which is transporting WMD and the 
related materials on the high seas under the consent of the flag state. (‘Boarding 
Agreement’ will be discussed in section 3.7. of this paper.)  The flag state can 
authorize the PSI participant to conduct boarding on a ship flying its flag.  This 
notion seems to work well if those agreements are expanded broadly, however, it will 
probably not provide complete assurance for the state.  Because considering that 
warships, and vessels owned or operated by a state and used only on government 
non-commercial service have “complete immunity” on the high seas from the 
jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state, under Articles 95 and 96, thus, such 
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vessels would not be stopped even if they are transporting WMD or the related 
materials.133  Thus, if the “states of proliferation concerns” uses its warships for 
transporting WMD and the related materials, there is no way to hamper it.  
 There is discussion, nevertheless, that the interdiction activities on the high 
seas could be justified under the purpose of the high seas.134  Article 88 states that 
“[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”135  Moreover, Article 301 
states; 
 
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this 
Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.136  
 
 Accordingly, the freedom of navigation on the high seas provided under 
Article 87 can be limited to the peaceful uses of the high seas and states should not 
make any threats to any states.137  The PSI participants may possibly claim that the 
use of the high seas for transportation of WMD or the related materials are against 
“peaceful purposes.  However, considering that U.S. nuclear-powered warships or 
warships carrying nuclear arms are navigating the world’s oceans, it is unlikely that 
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the PSI participants will seek justification of interdiction of WMD or the related 
materials on the high seas to these Articles.138 
  
3.6.1. The Yin He incident 
In July 1993, the Chinese vessel Yin He, departed from a port in China 
bound for Iran, was suspected by the United States of carrying an illicit cargo of 
thiodiglycol, a mustard gas base, and thionyl chloride, used in nerve gas.139  The Yin 
He was ordered to follow a U.S. warship while military aircraft took aerial photos of 
it.  It was, then, lead to the port of Damman, Saudi Arabia where an inspection of 
the cargo was carried out between August 26 and September 4, 1993, by Saudi 
Arabian officials and American technical experts in the presence of Chinese officials.  
The result showed that the Yin He was carrying purely commercial chemicals and 
nothing related to WMD, thus, it was allowed to go on its way.  Consequently, 
China accused the United States of its infringing China's sovereignty and its right of 
freedom of navigation in international waters. 
 The Yin He was ordered, on the high seas, to follow the U.S. warship 
without the consensus of China, the flag state, even though it was just carrying 
chemicals for commercial use.  Therefore, this incident was most likely an illegal 
act under Article 110; any action or status of the Yin He did not fall under it.  At the 
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time of the incident, neither the United States nor China were party to UNCLOS, 
accordingly, customary international law would be applicable.140  Thus, on the high 
seas, the freedom of navigation and the exclusive jurisdiction of a flag state over 
vessels that are flying its flag should be assured, and the final result would be the 
same.141   
 
3.7. Boarding Agreement 
As has been previously seen, it appears that the PSI activities encouraged in 
the SOP to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials 
worldwide, contain several incompatibilities with UNCLOS.  The PSI will not give 
any new legal power to the PSI participants, on the contrary, the PSI activities must 
still be conducted under international law and regime.  Nevertheless, paragraph 4 
(c) of the SOP seeks to find its way by asking the PSI participants “[t]o seriously 
consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and 
searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such 
WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.”142  On 
the high seas, a flag state holds exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag, 
however, if the flag state comes to a consensus with state ‘A’ for boarding and 
searching its flagged vessels, state ‘A’ can board and search the vessels.  Therefore, 
the United States has been signing bilateral boarding agreements with several states 
so that it can take the necessary actions to interdict WMD or the related materials on 
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the high seas under the consent of the flag state.143  This boarding agreement in 
accordance with the PSI is modeled following similar arrangements that are set, for 
example, to counter drug smuggling.144  
On February 11, 2004, the United States and Liberia, the world’s second 
largest shipping registry, signed an agreement on ship boarding in accordance with 
the PSI.145  Under this agreement, authorities on a bilateral basis are given to board 
vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, or 
related materials. Article 4, Operations in International Waters, of the agreement 
states: 
 
Whenever the Security Force Officials of one Party (“the requesting 
Party”) encounter a suspect vessel claiming nationality in the other Party 
(“the requested Party”) located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, the 
requesting Party may request through the Competent Authority of the 
requested Party that it: 
a. confirm the claim of nationality of the suspect vessel; and  
b. if such claim is confirmed:  
i. authorize the boarding and search of the suspect vessel, cargo 
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and the persons found on board by Security Force Officials of the 
requesting Party; and  
ii. if evidence of proliferation is found, authorize the Security 
Force Officials of the requesting Party to detain the vessel, as well 
as items and persons on board, pending instructions conveyed 
through the Competent Authority of the requested Party as to the 
actions the requesting Party is permitted to take concerning such 
items, persons and vessels.146  
 
Under the request of “the requesting Party”, “the requested Party” has to 
respond to such requests within ‘two hours’.147  If “the requested Party” can not 
respond to such requests within two hours, “the requesting Party will be deemed to 
have been authorized to board the suspect vessel for the purpose of inspecting the 
vessel’s documents, questioning the persons on board, and searching the vessel to 
determine if it is engaged in proliferation by sea.” 148   Therefore, under the 
agreement, the United States can interdict a suspected vessel, flagged in Liberia, with 
the consent of Liberia, and if there is no response from Liberia within two hours, the 
United States can deem that Liberia has given its authorization to the United States 
and conduct boarding and search the vessel.   
 Following the bilateral agreement between the United States and Liberia, the 
                                                 
146 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Liberia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,"  (February 11, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm., Article 4. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid.  
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United States has signed similar agreements with Panama (May 12, 2004),149 the 
Marshall Islands (August 13, 2004),150 Croatia (June 1, 2005),151 Cyprus (July 25, 
2005),152 Belize (August 4, 2005),153 Malta (March 15, 2007),154 and Mongolia 
(October 23, 2007).155  As of January 1, 2007, the combination of states with which 
the United States has made boarding agreements and the PSI participants account for 
more than 60 % of the world’s commercial fleet (100 gross tonnage and above) in 
dead-weight tonnage.156  With such a large coverage of the worldwide ship registry, 
the bilateral ship boarding agreement may increase the probability for the PSI 
                                                 
149 "Supplementary Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Republic of Panama to the Arrangement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the 
United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and 
Justice,"  (Panama February 5, 2002), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32859.htm. 
150 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,"  (August 
13, 2004), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/35237.htm. 
151 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Croatia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials,"  (June 1, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/47086.htm. 
152 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,"  (July 25, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/50274.htm. 
153 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Belize Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea ",  (August 4, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/50809.htm. 
154 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Malta Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,"  (March 15, 2007), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/81883.htm. 
155 "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Mongolia Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials by Sea,"  (October 23, 2007), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/94626.htm. 
156 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime 
Transport 2007 (New York and Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2007)., 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Webflyer.asp?intItemID=4398 
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participants to stop, search, and seize suspected vessels that are transporting WMD or 
the related materials.157  Thus, the United States has made agreements with the 
major flags of registry states.  If this partnership within the PSI participants goes 
well, Bolton’s statement might hold true; “[o]ur goal is to work with other concerned 
states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on 
land. … Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the 
world’s most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hand of our 
enemies.”158   
However, there are several critics of this ship boarding agreement.  
Valencia states that the flag-state consent regime is the fundamental principles of 
international law and “it cannot be overturned or eroded by the practice of a few 
countries over such a short period of time.”159  Chaffee notes that bilateral ship 
boarding agreements have “the potential for eroding the multilateral framework 
pursued through UNCLOS.”160 
 Moreover, if a vessel is registered in a state which has not concluded an 
agreement with the PSI participants, the vessel would not be stopped, searched, and 
seized even if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is carrying 
                                                 
157  See Andrew Prosser and Herbert Scoville, "The Proliferation Security Initiative in 
Perspective," June 16, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.  Lehrman suggests that PSI 
participants sign ship boarding agreements to ensure enforcement of the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540.  Thomas D. Lehrman, "Rethinking Interdiction: The Future of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative," The Nonproliferation Review 11, no. 2 (2004), 24. 
158 Bolton, note 15 above.  
159 Mark J Valencia, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full," Arms Control 
Today 37, no. 5 (2007). 
160 Chaffee, note 96 above. Chaffee also states that the pressure of aid and power disparities is 
likely to be a tool for acquiring an agreement.  For example, just before the agreement between 
the United States and Liberia, $200 million for humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and $245 
million for peacekeeping aid were pledged to Liberia. 
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WMD or the related materials.161  Moreover, if the vessel is a warship, or owned or 
operated by a government as a non-commercial service, it has complete immunity 
from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state.162  Therefore, if a 
suspected vessel is registered in North Korea or Iran, it is unlikely that the PSI 
participants will stop, search, and seize the vessel.163  Thus, it seems that the PSI 
activities still contain a “big hole.”164
                                                 
161 See Valencia, note 159 above.  
162 UNCLOS, Articles 95 and 96.; See Nikitin, note 62 above.  
163 Michael Richardson, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): An Assessment of Its 
Strengths & Weaknesses, with Some Proposals for Shaping Its Future," Trends in Southeast Asia 
Series 3 (2006): 15. http://www.iseas.edu.sg/tr32006.pdf. 
164 Timothy C Perry, "Blurring the Ocean Zones: The Effect of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative on the Customary International Law of the Sea," Ocean Development & International 
Law 37 (2006): 39. 
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CHAPTER 4.  IMPLICATION OF THE 2005 SUA CONVENTION 
IN THE PSI PERSPECTIVE  
The introduction of the PSI has made a great impact on the worldwide trend 
of counter-terrorism; however, it does not give any new legal authority to its 
participants.  On the contrary, the PSI activities must still be conducted under 
international law and regime.  Therefore, as has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, PSI activities contain several incompatibilities with UNCLOS.  Therefore, 
the United States has been signing bilateral boarding agreements to overcome the 
controversial issues pertaining to UNCLOS.  
In order to legally prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related materials worldwide, it is necessary to include authorities for the interdiction 
activities into the international legal framework.  Therefore, along with signing 
bilateral agreements, the United States has been attempting to seek their legal 
authority in the SUA Convention by amending the instrument since 2002.  
Consequently, two SUA Protocols were introduced in October 2005.  This Chapter 
will examine how these new 2005 SUA Protocols will strengthen the PSI activities.  
Towards this aim, the chapter will first review the development of the 2005 SUA 
Convention, and, secondly, examine its two key provisions: the criminalization of 
WMD and the boarding provisions.  Finally, the chapter will examine the 
implications of the 2005 SUA Convention for the PSI activities. 
53 
 
4.1. Development of the 2005 SUA Convention  
4.1.1. The Achille Lauro incident 
On October 7, 1985, four armed Palestinian terrorists, members of the 
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), hijacked the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro which was carrying more than 
400 passengers and crew while en route from Alexandria, Egypt to Italy.165  They 
originally planned to bring their arms and explosives secretly into Israel, however, 
when they were discovered on board the vessel, they took passengers and crew 
hostage and evolved into hijackers.  The hijackers threatened to kill passengers 
unless Israel released 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.  Their demands were 
not met and consequently, the following afternoon, the hijackers killed a handicapped 
Jewish, American citizen, and threw his body, with his wheelchair, into the sea.  
Negotiations followed with the result that the hijackers surrendered at Port Said, 
                                                 
165 It is not clear whether the initial seizure was on the high seas or within the territorial waters 
of Egypt, however, it is clear that the ship was on the high seas while being held by the hijackers.  
See Malvina Halberstam, "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO 
Convention on Maritime Safety," The American Journal of International Law 82, no. 2 (1988): 
269. http://www.jstor.org/. For the description of Achille Lauro incident, see Ibid.; Marie 
Jacobsson, "Terrorism at Sea," in Maritime Violence and Other Security Issues at Sea ed. 
Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maximo Quibranza Mejia Jr, and Gotthard M. Gauci (World Maritime 
University, Malmö, Sweden: WMU Publication, 2002), 157-58.; Brad J. Kieserman, "Preventing 
and Defeating Terrorism at Sea : Practical Considerations for Implementation of the Draft 
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA)," in Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China, ed. Myron H. 
Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Kuen-chen Fu (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers  
2006), 425-26.; Kofi Mbiah, "The Revision of the SUA Convention: An Update," in 
Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security : A Selection of Papers and Presentations from the 
Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of the ISPS Code, 
11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime 
Security 30th August - 1st September 2004, ed. Maximo Quibranza Mejia Jr (Malmö, Sweden: 
WMU Publications 2004), 163.;  
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Egypt on October 10 with a guarantee of safe passage out of Egypt.  They were then 
sent to Tunisia by an official Egyptian airplane.  However, under pressure from the 
United States, the Tunisian government could not allow the airplane to land in their 
country and, eventually, U.S. Navy fighters forced it to land at a NATO airbase in 
Sicily, Italy where the Italian authorities took custody of the hijackers.166 
 
4.1.2. Development of SUA Convention 
Following the Achille Lauro incident, Resolution A.584(14), Measures to 
prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their 
passengers and crews, was adopted at International Maritime Organization (IMO) on 
November 20, 1985 with concern for “the danger to passengers and crews resulting 
from the increasing number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other 
unlawful acts against or on board ships, including small craft, both at anchor and 
under way.”167  The resolution sought the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to 
develop detailed and practical technical measures to ensure the security of passengers 
and crew on board vessels.168  Moreover, on December 9, 1985, the General 
Assembly of the UN requested IMO “to study the problem of terrorism aboard or 
against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures” 
under its resolution A/RES/40/61.169  In September 1986, the MSC issued its 
                                                 
166 There was a dispute whether the Italian or U.S. authorities had jurisdiction over the case, 
however, they agreed that Italian forces should take custody of the hijackers.  See Kieserman, 
note 165 above, at 426. 
167 IMO Assembly Resolution A.584(14). 
168 Ibid. 
169 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/61. 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r061.htm. 
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circular, MSC/Circ.443, Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and 
crews on board ships, in which governments, port authorities, administrations, 
shipowners, shipmasters, and crews were requested to take appropriate measures 
against unlawful acts threatening passengers and crews on board vessels.170  
In November 1986, following the process above, the government of Austria, 
Egypt, and Italy proposed a draft convention to the IMO on the subject of unlawful 
acts against the safety of maritime navigation.171  Then, based on this proposal, a 
conference held in Rome in March 1988 adopted the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).  
The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platform Located on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms) was 
also adopted at the same time.  The main purpose of the SUA Convention and SUA 
Protocol for Fixed Platforms is “to provide an international legal basis for action to 
be taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships and fixed platforms 
located on the continental shelf.”172  In the SUA Convention, these unlawful acts 
include “the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board 
ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or 
damage it.”173  The SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms contains similar provisions as 
in the SUA Convention, relating to the unlawful acts which are committed against 
                                                 
170 IMO, MSC Circular MSC/Circ.443. 
171 Z Oya Özçayır, "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)," Journal of International Maritime Law 11, 
no. 6 (2005): 432. 
172 International Maritime Organization, SUA Convention (London: IMO Publication, 2006), 
iii.(Foreword)  
173 See IMO web-site: http://www.imo.org/. 
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fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.  The SUA Convention and its 
protocol define offences in Article 3 and Article 2, respectively, and require each 
State Party to take the necessary measures for establishing jurisdiction over the 
offences.   
 Both the SUA Convention and SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms entered 
into force on March 1, 1992. As of June 2008, the number of contracting174 states 
for the SUA Convention is 149, representing 92.75 % of world tonnage and for 
the SUA protocol for Fixed Platforms 138 contracting states, representing 87.77 % 
of the world tonnage.175  
 
4.1.3. Development of the 2005 SUA Protocols 
Following the tragic events of 9/11, 2001, the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council adopted resolutions A/RES/56/1 and S/RES/1368, on September 18 
and 12, respectively, condemning the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.176  
Further, the Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES/1373 on September 28, 
requesting the international community to strengthen its effort to prevent and 
                                                 
174 These countries that have made ratifications, acceptances, approvals, or accessions to the 
instruments. 
175 See IMO Council report, C 100/17.; See also Status of Summary of Conventions in IMO 
web-site: http://www.imo.org/.; Until the tragic event of 9/11, many of the countries that 
contracted the instrument were those countries which border the Straits of Malacca and the 
South China Sea where unlawful acts were increasing.  However, following the incident, 
more than 70 countries had contracted to the instrument within two years. See P.K. 
Mukherjee and M.Q. Mejia Jr., "The SUA Convention 2005: A Critical Evaluation of Its 
Effectiveness in Suppressing Maritime Criminal Acts " Journal of International Maritime 
Law 12, no. 3 (2006): 175. See also P. K. Mukherjee, "The New SUA Convention 2005 in 
Perspective," Shipping & Transport International 6, no. 1 (2006): 12. 
176 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/1.  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/475/00/PDF/N0147500.pdf?OpenElement.;  
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1368 (2001).  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement. 
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suppress terrorist acts, including the full implementation of anti-terrorist 
conventions. 177   Taking the UN resolutions, the IMO assembly adopted its 
Resolution A.924(22), Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of 
Terrorism Which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of 
Ships, on November 20, which requested the Maritime Safety Committee, the Legal 
Committee, and the Facilitation Committee to review existing international legal and 
technical measures to see whether there was a need to update the relevant IMO 
instruments or to create new measures in order to prevent and suppress terrorism 
against vessels and to improve security aboard and ashore.178 
Accordingly, the Legal Committee started the review of the SUA 
Convention in 2002 and the following issues, inter alia, were considered as the scope 
of the review of the Convention: 
 
- revision and expansion of the offences in article 3 to ensure that a wider 
range of unlawful acts are covered by the Convention in the light of the 
experience of 11 September; 
- enlarging the scope of application to cover domestic cabotage 
navigation; and 
- widening/strengthening the regulations on jurisdiction and extradition, 
including for instance, making it obligatory not to use the political 
offence exception in order to deny extradition.179 
                                                 
177 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1373 (2001).  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement. 
178 IMO Assembly Resolution A.924(22). 
179 IMO, LEG 84/6. 
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Subsequently, the United States and Turkey submitted a proposal for 
amending the SUA Convention at the 84th session of the Legal Committee.180  The 
United States suggested, inter alia, for the amendment to: clearly address prohibiting 
activities which “knowingly and unlawfully” provide international maritime 
transportation to persons, or for supplies that are committing SUA offences; address 
the issue of transportation of WMD and their means of delivery which is in violation 
of applicable international non-proliferation agreements; criminalize using the ship 
or its cargo as a weapon.181  
During its 85th session, October 21 - 25, 2002, the Committee discussed, 
inter alia, seven proposed offences which could be added to the SUA Convention; 
four of them concerned activities taking place on the ship or directed towards a ship 
involved in terrorist acts; one concerned the presence of tools or substances on a ship 
useful for WMD; and two of the new offences concerned the use of the ship for 
transporting of WMD related material.182  At this session, Japan commented that the 
proposal submitted by the United States considerably exceeded the scope of the SUA 
Convention and Protocol, and some of the offences had already been criminalized by 
other conventions.183  The 86th session, April 28 - May 2, 2003, discussed, inter 
alia, to insert a reference to the protection of rights and freedoms of seafarers in the 
proposal.184  The review of the SUA Convention was continued on a priority basis 
                                                 
180 IMO, LEG 84/6/1.; IMO LEG84/6/2.  
181 IMO, LEG 84/6/1.   
182 IMO, LEG 85/11., paragraph 70. Discussion was made based on LEG 85/4 which contains a 
draft protocol to the SUA Convention in annex 1. See IMO, LEG 85/4 and its Annex. 
183 IMO, LEG 85/4/1. 
184 IMO, LEG 86/15., paragraph 46.  
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in the 87th session, October 13-17, 2003.  At the subsequent 88th session, April 
19-23, 2004, while most of the delegations supported the revision of the SUA 
Convention, several delegations cautioned that the 2005 SUA Protocols would not 
jeopardize the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage 
which are guaranteed in UNCLOS and it would not cause unnecessary disturbance of 
international commercial navigation.185  At the 89th session, October 25-29, 2004, 
and 90th session, April 18-29, 2005, the review work was finalized to prepare for the 
diplomatic conference scheduled in October 2005.  
Following three years of discussion, the diplomatic conference was held on 
October 10-14, 2005 and duly adopted the amendments in the form of two protocols 
on October 15; the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 Protocol to the SUA 
Convention) and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 
(2005 Protocol to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms).186  The 2005 Protocol to 
                                                 
185 IMO, LEG 88/13., paragraphs 34 and 35. 
186 Under Article 15(2) of the Protocol of 2005 to the SUA Convention, consolidated text of the 
SUA Convention and the Protocol of 2005 to the SUA Convention is called “2005 SUA 
Convention” in short, and likewise, under Article 6(2) of the Protocol of 2005 to the SUA 
Protocol for Fixed Platforms, consolidated text of SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms and the 
Protocol of 2005 to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms is called “2005 SUA Fixed Platforms 
Protocol” in short.  The following texts in this paper use these shortened forms for convenience.  
Also, when the Articles are cited, they refer to the Articles in the consolidated version of the 2005 
SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol. 
Although the United States may be a driving force for the amendment of the SUA Convention, it 
must not be forgot that all the process is negotiated within a large multilateral forum.  Delegates 
from 72 states parties to the SUA Convention and 68 states parties to the SUA Protocol for Fixed 
Platforms attended at the conference.  See Richard Shaw, "Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA): Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA 
Convention and Protocol," Journal of International Maritime Law 11, no. 5 (2005), 379.; 
Gouglas Guilfoyle, "Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Journal of Conflict 
& Security Law 12, no. 1 (2007), 28. http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/. 
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the SUA Convention contain two key features: 
- broadening the range of offences in Article 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater; and  
- introducing the provisions which allow states to board a vessel, which is 
suspected of committing an offence provided in Article 3bis, 3ter, and 
3quater, flying the flag of a Parties to the 2005 SUA Convention on the 
high seas in Article 8bis. 
Although the process for amendment for the SUA Convention began at the 
84th session in 2002, that is before the PSI’s principles (SOP) were announced in 
2003, the two key features of the 2005 Protocols to the SUA Convention and the 
SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms have very close relationships with the PSI 
activities.  Firstly, the new Convention criminalizes transportation of WMD and the 
related materials under Article 3bis(b), which the United States and like-minded 
countries have been craving as a legal basis for the interdiction of WMD and the 
related materials in the PSI activities, and secondly, the newly added provision 
regarding the boarding of suspected vessels on the high seas contain exactly the same 
notion as the boarding agreement which the United States has been proceeding since 
it made an agreement with Liberia in February 2004.  
 
4.2. Key provisions of the 2005 SUA Convention for PSI activities 
4.2.1. Criminalization of transportation of WMD  
The 2005 SUA Convention provides a definition for biological weapons, 
chemical weapons, and nuclear (BCN) weapons, namely WMD, in Article 1(d) (See 
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Appendix D for extract of the 2005 SUA Convention).187   The definition of 
biological weapons is extracted from Article I of the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972 (BWC), which entered into force in 
1975, likewise, the definition of chemical weapons is extracted from Article II(1) and 
(9) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 1993 (CWC), 
which entered into force in 1997.  
 Under Article 3bis(b), “transport” 188  of certain materials is newly 
criminalized as follows. 
 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 
….  
(b) transports on board a ship:  
(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is 
intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or 
without a condition, as is provided for under national law, 
death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of 
intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
                                                 
187 In the 88th session on March 19, 2004, Mexico proposed for the amendment to clearly define 
WMD.  See IMO, LEG 88/13., paragraph 31.; LEG 88/3/1. 
188 “[T]ransport” is defined as “to initiate, arrange or exercise effective control, including 
decision-making authority, over the movement of a person or item” in Article 1(1)(b). 
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act; or  
(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as 
defined in article 1; or  
(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or 
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, 
knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive 
activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards 
pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; or 
(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related 
technology that significantly contributes to the design, 
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the 
intention that it will be used for such purpose.189 
 
However, as the text shows, each act would become an offence under certain 
conditions.  For offence (i), the subject should know that “it is intended to be used 
to cause, or in a threat to cause, … death or serious injury or damage for the purpose 
of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”190  For offence (ii), the subject 
should know that it is BCN weapons as defined in Article 1.  For offence (iii), the 
subject should know that said materials are “intended to be used in a nuclear 
explosive activity … not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive 
                                                 
189 2005 SUA Convention, Article 3bis(b). 
190 Ibid. 
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safeguards agreement.”191  For offence (iv), the subject should know that said 
materials would “contribute(s) to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN 
weapon.”192  Therefore, for example, if a person transports WMD related materials 
without knowing that it is such, the person does not commit an offence.  The person 
should “unlawfully and intentionally” commit the action stated under the Article for 
it to be an offence.193   
Moreover, the “saving clause” is made in Articles 2bis and 3bis(2) (See 
Appendix D).  Article 2bis states, “[n]othing in this Convention shall affect the 
rights, obligations and responsibilities” of state parties under the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), BWC, and CWC.194  Further, Article 
3bis(2) states, “it shall not be an offence within the meaning of this Convention to 
transport an item or material covered by Paragraph 1(b)(iii) or, … , paragraph 
1(b)(iv), if such item or material is transported to or from the territory of, or is 
otherwise transported under the control of, a State Party” to the NPT.195  It must be 
noted, however, that India emphasized that the “saving clause” discriminates against 
the non-State parties to the NPT and hampers the right of those countries pursuing 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.196  Although there is a certain compromise for 
criminalizing the transportation of WMD, it was included as it is in the current 2005 
                                                 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Mukherjee and Mejia provide detailed discussion on this point.  See Mukherjee and Mejia, 
note 175 above at 177-80.; See also Mukherjee, note 175 above, at 13-14.  
194 2005 SUA Convention, Article 2bis(3). 
195 Ibid., Article 3bis(2). 
196 IMO, LEG/CONF.15/12.  Reddy, negotiator on behalf of India in the IMO Legal Committee 
for the amendment of SUA Convention, spoke that the “saving clause” shows the “dubious 
intention of the nuclear states to control the overall nuclear trade.”  See A Sudhakar Reddy, 
"Round Table Conference SUA Protocol: Some Reflections in International Law " National 
Maritime Foundation May 5, 2006. http://www.maritimeindia.org/index.php/. 
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SUA Convention with the support of Canada, France, the U.K., and the United 
States197 
Other provisions under Article 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater (See Appendix D) 
regulate offences, inter alia, in which a person is unlawfully and intentionally, “to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act”; “transport[ing] another person on board a 
ship knowing that the person has committed an act that constitute an offence” in 
Article 3, 3bis, or 3quater, or any other offences in other treaties listed in Annex of 
the Convention; “injur[ing] or kill[ing] any person in connection with the 
commission of any of the offences” in Article 3, 3bis, or 3quater or any other 
offences in other treaties listed in the Annex of the Convention. 
Under Article 5 (See Appendix D), states are required to make the offences 
provided in Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater punishable by appropriate penalties 
taking into account the grave nature of those offences.198  Moreover, under Article 
5bis (See Appendix D) states are required to take necessary measures to enable a 
legal entity located in its territory to be liable under its domestic law when a person 
responsible for management or control of that legal entity has committed an offence 
in this Convention.199   
The prohibition of the transportation of WMD in the 2005 SUA Convention 
greatly supports the PSI activities and gives the PSI its legal backbone.  States can 
exercise “right of visit” to a vessel on the high seas, under Article 110 of UNCLOS, 
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198 2005 SUA Convention, Article 5. 
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65 
if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the vessel is engaging in piracy, 
the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or without nationality; although if flying a 
foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the vessel is, in reality, of the same 
nationality as a warship.200  However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the conditions 
given under Article 110 do not include the carriage and transportation of WMD or 
the related materials.  Thus, as in the So San case, states might visit the vessel of a 
foreign flag on the high seas under the condition of Article 110 of UNCLOS, 
however, states could not condemn the carriage of WMD and there is no legal ground 
to seize the cargo, WMD and the related materials.  States can, now, condemn the 
transportation of WMD and the related materials as an offence according to the 2005 
SUA Convention if the transporting state is not a party to NPT.  
 
4.2.2. Boarding provisions  
The newly added Article 8bis (See Appendix D) provides a comprehensive 
set of procedures and protections with respect to ship boarding by the third party to 
prevent and suppress unlawful acts under this Convention.  Under Article 8bis(1), 
state parties are required to co-operate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and 
suppress unlawful acts covered by the Convention.201  Article 8bis(4) allows a state 
party to request the assistance of other state parties in preventing or suppressing an 
offence that is established under Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater if there is reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the offence has been, is being, or is about to be committed on 
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a vessel flying its flag.202  Following the request, the requested parties are required 
to render assistance with the means available to them.203 
Under Article 8bis(5), whenever a state party (the requesting Party) 
encounters a vessel flying the flag of another state party (the flag State) in the 
seaward of any State’s territorial seas (EEZ or on the high seas), and if the requesting 
Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel has been, is, or is about to be 
involved in committing an offence under Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater, and the 
requesting party desires to board the suspect vessel, the requesting Party and the flag 
State are placed under certain obligations as follow: 
- the requesting Party requests the flag state to confirm the nationality of 
the suspect vessel; 
- if the nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party requests the flag state 
to authorize to board and to take appropriate measures which may include 
stopping, boarding and searching the vessel and questioning the person on 
board; 
- the flag state is required to, either, give the authorization to the requesting 
Party to board and to take appropriate measures; conduct the boarding and 
search on its own or together with the requesting Party; or decline to 
authorize a boarding and search.204    
Therefore, the requesting Party cannot board and take appropriate measures without 
the flag state’s consent even if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel has 
                                                 
202 Ibid., paragraph (4). 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid., paragraph (5). 
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been, is, or is about to be involved in committing an offence under Article 3, 3bis, 
3ter, or 3quater; this is compatible with the provision set under UNCLOS.  On the 
high seas, vessels are subject to flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction under Article 92 of 
UNCLOS, thus, only the flag state of the vessel can exercise jurisdiction on the 
vessel. 
However, the new 2005 SUA Convention would change the notion of this 
flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, when it enters into force.  Article 
8bis(5)(d) states: 
 
Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General 
that, with respect to ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, 
the requesting Party is granted authorization to board and search the ship, 
its cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board in 
order to locate and examine documentation of its nationality and 
determine if an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has 
been, is being or is about to be committed, if there is no response from 
the first Party within four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a 
request to confirm nationality.205 
 
Therefore, the requesting party would be granted the authorization to board 
and search the suspected vessel if there is no response from the flag state within ‘four 
                                                 
205 Ibid., paragraph(5)(d). 
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hours’ of the request, under the condition that the flag state notifies the 
Secretary-General of IMO of such an arrangement upon or after becoming a party.  
Under, Article 8bis(5)(e), a state party can even give its authorization to the 
requesting party ‘automatically’ if the requesting party finds an offence set forth in 
Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater has been, is being, or is about to be committed, by 
notifying the Secretary-General of IMO of such arrangement upon or after becoming 
a party.  With this sub-paragraph (e), the requesting party does not, even, need to 
wait for four hours to get the authorization from the flag state.  However, the flag 
state can withdraw these arrangements set under sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) at any 
time.206  Nevertheless, these two sub-paragraphs bring a certain change to the 
notion of the flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.  At the 88th session 
of the Legal Committee, however, it was recognized that the principle of flag state 
jurisdiction must be respected to the utmost extent and a boarding by another state on 
the high seas may take place in “exceptional circumstances.”207  As such, some 
delegations showed their concern that the notion of “tacit acceptance” for boarding 
was not acceptable as it was inconsistent with the exclusive flag state jurisdiction set 
under Article 92 of UNCLOS and if “tacit acceptance” was to be allowed, it should 
be in the form of an “opt-in” clause.208  
 Taking the concern of the flag state’s exclusive jurisdiction into account, the 
following sub-paragraphs duly paying attention to it.  For example, under Article 
8bis(6), the flag state may authorize the requesting party to detain the vessel, cargo 
                                                 
206 Ibid., and sub-paragraph (e). 
207 IMO, LEG88/13., paragraph 66. 
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and persons on board and the requesting party is required to inform the flag state of 
the results of a boarding.209  Moreover, under paragraph (7), the requesting party 
cannot take any additional measures without the express authorization of the flag 
state.210  Further, paragraph (8) confirms that the flag state has the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over a vessel for seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution although it 
can consent to a requesting state to exercise the jurisdiction.211  
 Paragraphs (6) and (8) cast quite important notions on the PSI activities.  
As the So San incident indicated, states could exercise the “right of visit” to a vessel 
on the high seas if the conditions set under Article 110 of UNCLOS are met, however, 
there was no clear authority to seize the cargo.  However, paragraphs (6) and (8) 
allow states to exercise jurisdiction for detainment, seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and 
prosecution if the flag state authorizes it.  Therefore, states may seize WMD and the 
related material on board a foreign flagged vessel on the high seas.  The 2005 SUA 
Convention will provide quite a strong legal basis to the WMD interdiction operation 
of the PSI, when it enters into force. 
 
4.3. Implications of the 2005 SUA Convention for PSI  
4.3.1. Strengthening PSI activities  
By adopting the 2005 SUA Convention the transportation of WMD and the 
related material is criminalized under Article 3bis(b),  although there is a condition 
that the person should “unlawfully and intentionally” commit the offence under the 
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211 Ibid., paragraph (8). 
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Article.  Moreover, under Article 8bis states are given a strong legal basis to stop, 
search, and seize WMD and the related material on board a foreign flagged vessel on 
the high seas if the flag state authorizes them to do so.  As long as there is a flag 
state’s authorization, a state might have taken appropriate measures on a vessel 
which is carrying WMD and the related materials even before the 2005 SUA 
Convention was adopted, however, clear legislation in an international convention 
which provides a comprehensive set of procedures and protections with respect to 
ship boarding surely strengthens the worldwide trend of counter-terrorism and the 
PSI activities.  
 The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) affirms that the 
proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security and 
calls for all states to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of 
WMD.212  The UN Security Council resolution was proposed by the United States 
to criminalize the proliferation of WMD,213 although the phrase to ‘criminalize the 
proliferation of weapons’ was not included when it was adopted.  The draft of the 
resolution, moreover, contained the explicit term ‘to interdict,’ however, this was also 
changed to the phrase ‘to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking’ after 
China’s objections.214  It thus seems that the United States and like-minded states 
finally succeeded in its attempt to ‘criminalize’ the transportation of WMD in the 
2005 SUA Convention. 
 
                                                 
212 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1540 (2004).  
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4.3.2. Considerations of the 2005 SUA Convention  
 Although the 2005 SUA Convention is expected to strengthen the curtailing 
of the proliferation of WMD, it still entails issues to be considered.  Firstly, the 
scope of the SUA Convention does not necessarily fit into the scope of 
non-proliferation activities.215  The non-proliferation activities encouraged under 
UN Security Council 1540 and the PSI are aimed to achieve “international peace and 
security.”216  On the contrary, the scope of the SUA Convention is to provide an 
international legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing unlawful 
acts against “the safety of maritime navigation”, which was sought following the 
Achille Lauro incident. While the transportation of WMD and the related material 
certainly falls under the threat to “international peace and security,” it does not 
necessarily cause any danger to the “safety of maritime navigation.”217  This is why 
Japan, as previously seen, cautioned from the very early stage of the amendment 
process that the proposal of the United States considerably exceeds the scope of the 
current SUA Convention.218  Moreover, some delegations suggested it is more 
desirable to develop a new convention rather than a protocol form amending the 
original convention.219  Further, others showed their concerns that the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
                                                 
215 See Lee Sik Chai, "The Revision of the SUA Conventions: A Brief Look Ahead by a 
Maritime Lawyer," in Coastal Zone Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts at Sea: A Selection of 
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Weapons (OPCW) are more appropriate places to discuss non-proliferation issues 
rather than IMO.220  
 Secondly, under Article 2, the Convention does not apply to a warship, or a 
vessel owned or operated by a state when used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or 
police.  Moreover, Article 2(2) states, “Nothing in this Convention affects the 
immunities of warships and other Government vessels operated for non-commercial 
purposes.”221  These provisions reserve compatibility with Articles 95 and 96 of 
UNCLOS which regulate the “complete immunity” of warships, and vessels owned 
or operated by a State and used only in government non-commercial services on the 
high seas. 222   Accordingly, if ‘states of proliferation concern’ use their own 
government vessels for transporting WMD and the related materials, no state can 
intervene in their ‘unlawful’223 acts as it would not be an unlawful act within the 
context of this Convention.  Moreover, as already seen, the “saving clause” has 
been included in Articles 2bis and 3bis(2).  Therefore, if a state is a party to the NPT, 
the transportation of WMD and the related materials would not be an offence within 
the meaning of this Convention. 
Thirdly, pessimistic views can be perceived for the entry into force of two 
2005 SUA Protocols.  Two 2005 SUA Protocols apply only to those state parties to 
the instruments.  It is easily estimated that those ‘states of proliferation concern’ 
                                                 
220 IMO, LEG 87/17., paragraph 105. 
221 2005 SUA Convention, Article 2(2). 
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would not be likely to ratify the Convention. Moreover, it is unlikely that states 
which are not party to the NPT would become a party to the 2005 SUA Protocols.  
It was seen previously, that India strongly objected to the saving clause because it 
would be discriminatory to non-state parties to those treaties.224  In order to stop, 
search, board, and seize a vessel, not only the ‘requesting state,’ but also the 
‘requested state (flag state)’ surely needs to be a party to the 2005 SUA Protocols.  
The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention will enter into force ninety days after the 
date on which twelve states have “either signed it without reservation as to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, or have deposited an instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General.”225  For the 2005 
Protocol to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms, it requires ratification from three 
States which are also parties to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms, however, it 
will not enter into force before the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention has entered 
into force.226  As of June 6, 2008, six states have signed the 2005 Protocol to the 
SUA Convention and four states the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Protocol for Fixed 
Platforms.227  However, none of the above signatures is operative.228 
 
4.3.3. Correlation between the 2005 SUA Convention and boarding 
agreement 
The provisions which are newly set in the 2005 SUA Convention use quite 
                                                 
224 See discussion in this Chapter, 4.2.1. 
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similar language to that used in the bilateral boarding agreements which the United 
States has been proceeding since 2004 to enhance its PSI activities.229  For example, 
Article 4(3)(d) of the boarding agreement which the United States made with Liberia 
states; 
 
[I]f there is no response from the Competent Authority of the requested 
Party [flag state] within two hours of its acknowledgment of receipt of 
the request, the requesting Party will be deemed to have been authorized 
to board the suspect vessel for the purpose of inspecting the vessel’s 
documents, questioning the persons on board, and searching the vessel 
to determine if it is engaged in proliferation by sea.230 (Italics added by 
author for emphasis) 
 
Two-hours is set in the case of the boarding agreement between the United 
States and Liberia for deemed authorization if there is no response for the request of 
the requesting party.  Moreover, under Article 5 of the agreement, the flag state may 
even waive its right to exercise jurisdiction over detainment, seizure, forfeiture, 
arrest, and prosecution and authorize the enforcement of the requesting party’s law 
against the vessel.231   This boarding agreement already entered into force on 
December 9, 2004. As previously indicated, the United States has signed similar 
boarding agreements with Panama, the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Belize, 
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Malta, and Mongolia, and those boarding agreements, except Mongolia, have already 
entered into force.232  By making a boarding agreement, the issue of flag state 
jurisdiction on the high seas can be overcome.  Moreover, the United States does 
not need to wait for the slow ratification pace of the 2005 SUA Convention and its 
entry into force.  It seems that ship boarding agreements allow more dynamic PSI 
operations than the 2005 SUA Convention would provide.  That is why, the United 
States has been consecutively processing the agreements with the major flags of 
registry countries.
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CHAPTER 5.  RESPONSES TO THE PSI IN THE EAST ASIAN 
REGION  
The notion of non-proliferation of WMD seems to have been acknowledged 
world wide as a precaution against terrorism, especially after the tragic incident of 
9/11.  It is also a great concern among the states in the East Asian region where one 
of the “proliferation concern states” is located.233  Although the PSI activities are in 
line with non-proliferation of WMD, the perceptions of the initiative that each 
country has seem to be different.  In this section, the responses of the major 
countries in the East Asian region towards the PSI will be overviewed.  
 
5.1. Japan  
Japan, as the only country that has suffered from the tragic use of atomic 
bombs, has been pursuing global disarmament and non-proliferation to achieve 
international peace and security.234  Japan sees the PSI as consistent with Japanese 
efforts towards the non-proliferation of WMD, delivery system, and the related 
materials, and, as such, joined the initiative at its establishment.235  Moreover, Japan 
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has been involved in the development of the principles of the PSI, the SOP, published 
in Paris in 2003, and actively engaged in PSI activities.  
In 2003, Japan attended the first PSI exercise, called “PACIFIC 
PROTECTOR,” which was held in the Coral Sea off of Australia during September 
10-13, and hosted by Australia, with France, Japan, and the United States 
participating.236  In October 2004, Japan hosted the PSI exercise “TEAM SAMURAI 
04” with the same five countries that had participated in the “PACIFIC 
PROTECTOR,” participating in the exercise.  Originally, this exercise was planned 
to be held in May, however, it was postponed until October because of concerns 
regarding China, North Korea, and South Korea.237  The deployment of the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in the exercise was criticized by these 
countries because of Japan’s historical imperialism.  As a result, the Japan Coast 
Guard (JCG), as a law enforcement agency, stopped and searched a suspicious vessel 
while guarded by the JMSDF during the scenario.238  In 2007, Japan also hosted 
another exercise, “PACIFIC SHIELD 07” where 40 countries, including observers, 
attended.239 
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 Japan has also conducted outreach activities so that the level of 
understanding of Asian countries concerning PSI would rise.  Japan has been 
hosting “Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)” since 2003 to 
strengthen efforts for the non-proliferation of WMD and related materials and 
increase the awareness of non-proliferation in Asia, where the role of PSI activities is 
also discussed.240  All the members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and several other countries which share common interests in the security 
of Asia have been attending the ASTOP.  The United States and South Korea have 
been attending the ASTOP since 2003 and China joined since the 2nd meeting held 
in 2005.241 
  
5.2. China  
China’s geographical features have their important meaning to the PSI 
activities where a land border is shared with North Korea and the air routes between 
North Korea and its WMD trading partners in South Asia and the Middle East pass 
through Chinese airspace.242  Thus, China’s participation in the PSI is desirable for 
other PSI participants to strengthen its effectiveness.  However, China reserves its 
position and concerns about the legality and the possible consequences of the 
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interdiction operations.243  At a Press Conference on December 4, 2003, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson commented on China’s position towards the PSI; 
 
the Chinese side understands the concerns of the PSI participating 
countries about the proliferation of WMD and their vehicles of delivery.  
However the international community also has some concerns about the 
legitimacy, effectiveness and possible consequences of the interception 
measures of PSI.  The PSI participating countries should give it a 
serious consideration.  China has always maintains that the 
proliferation issue should be handled through diplomatic and political 
methods within the framework of international laws, and all 
anti-proliferation measures should contribute to the international and 
regional peace, security and stability.244 
 
 Moreover, at the Press Conference on February 17, 2004, when Bolton, 
then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
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visited Chinese officials, China reiterated the above comment.245  Nevertheless, 
Bolton appreciated China’s understanding of the concern of PSI participating states 
with respect to WMD proliferation and emphasized that “[b]oth China and the United 
States obviously are firmly opposed to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and their means of delivery.”246  At the meeting, China and the United 
States agreed to enhance cooperation regarding information exchange and to 
continue a dialogue on PSI issues.247 However, it is still doubtful whether China will 
willingly exchange information, considering the relationship with North Korea.  
 
5.3. Russia  
Initially, Russia stayed out of the PSI, considering its legality under 
international law, even though the United States had tried to persuade them, and was 
the only member of the Group of Eight (G-8) not to join.248  However, on May 31, 
2004, while the first anniversary meeting of the PSI was being held in Krakow, 
Poland, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued a press 
release in Moscow, stating that “[t]he threats of WMD proliferation bear a global 
character and, accordingly, demand a global response.  We are convinced that only 
by collective efforts is it possible to cope with them….The principles for the 
Proliferation Security Initiative … correspond to our line in the field of 
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nonproliferation.”249  The announcement was greatly welcomed by the United 
States and other PSI participants.  Bolton welcomed Russia’s participation by 
noting “[w]e expect that our intelligence-sharing and law enforcement and military 
assets working with the Russian Federation will make a major contribution to our 
effort to interdict WMD trafficking worldwide.”250  He also stated that “Russia is a 
great naval power and it has extensive land and air space that can be used for 
commercial activities, which we hope and expect will now be closed to 
proliferators.”251  
However, it seems Russia is still concerned about the PSI’s legality under 
international law and a press release noted that Russia will contribute to the PSI, 
“with consideration for the compatibility of the actions with the rules of international 
law, for their conformance to national legislation and for the commonality of 
nonproliferation interests with the partners.”252  It is not clear whether Russia will 
actually support PSI operations when “states of proliferation of concern” commit 
their proliferation activities. 
 
5.4. South Korea 
Given its delicate position, South Korea has remained outside the PSI.  Its 
stance towards the PSI reflects its foreign policy, the “Sunshine Policy,” that has 
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attempted to ease tensions and achieve peaceful cooperation with North Korea, 
initiated by former President Kim Dae-Jung and succeeded by former President Roh 
Moo-hyun, until the current President Lee Myung-bak has taken a more aggressive 
stance towards North Korea.  On December 29, 2005, the South Korea National 
Security Council, reportedly decided to allow its officials to attend the PSI exercises 
as observers.253  South Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Pan Ki-mun, 
stated that the South Korean government’s position was to “cooperate on a 
case-by-case basis.”254  North Korea promptly reacted to South Korean’s decision 
and a spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland 
denounced that the decision is “unforgivable anti-national crime against fellow 
countrymen.” 255   Moreover, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the 
state-run agency of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and 
speaking for the Workers' Party of Korea and the government, wrote that South 
Korea’s attendance at the PSI is “a dangerous action of bedeviling the favorably 
developing inter-Korean relations and bringing nuclear holocaust to the Korean 
Peninsula” and it urged South Korea to withdraw its decision, otherwise it will be 
“accountable for all the consequences to be entailed.”256  
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The decision was kept secret for more than four weeks before it was revealed on January 24, 
2006, for the fear of negative impact on the six-party talks to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program.  See Ibid.  
254 Ibid. 
255 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, "S. Korean Authorities' Decision to Join in PSI Drill 
Assailed " February 10, 2006, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm/.  
256 Ibid. 
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 Although South Korea may not participate in the PSI activities, remaining as 
an observer, at least it is likely to cooperate on non-operational issues, such as 
information sharing, considering its close military relationship with the United 
States. 
 
5.5. North Korea 
PSI activities are not directed at any single country, however, instead, at 
would-be proliferators to hamper the worldwide trafficking of WMD, delivery 
systems, and related materials.  Nevertheless, it is also commonly acknowledged 
that North Korea is being targeted by the fact that the PSI was evolved from the So 
San incident where a North Korean vessel was stopped by the Spanish Navy and 
searched by Spanish and American officials while it was transporting scud missiles 
from North Korea to Yemen.  Moreover, at the second PSI meeting held in Brisbane, 
Australia, in July 2003, the Chairman’s Statement noted that “states and non-state 
actors of proliferation concern” referred to North Korea and Iran.257  Further, Bolton 
noted that “[w]ithout doubt, North Korea remains the world’s foremost proliferator 
of ballistic missiles and related technology to rogue states and hostile regimes.”258    
 In response to the PSI, North Korea has been denouncing the initiative.  At 
the time when the first PSI exercise, “PACIFIC PROTECTOR” was conducted in 
September 2003, North Korea condemned PSI activities stating that it is “a wanton 
violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK and intolerable military provocations as it 
                                                 
257 Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 20 above.  See section 2.3.1 for discussion about “States 
and non-state actors of proliferation concern.” 
258 Bolton, note 40 above.  
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was a prelude to a nuclear war.”259  It also noted that the PSI would lead “the 
DPRK-U.S. relations to an explosive phase.” 260   Moreover, when Japan was 
planning to host the PSI exercise in May 2004 and invited ASEAN members to 
observe it, North Korea judged that “its sovereignty is infringed upon even a bit 
owing to the vicious blockade of Japanese reactionaries its army and the people will 
counter it with a strong retaliation.”261  Considering its impact on neighbouring 
countries, Japan postponed the exercise until October later that year.
                                                 
259 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, "KCNA Assails U.S.-Led Multinational Naval 
Blockade Exercises," September 16, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm/.  
260 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, "U.S. Moves against DPRK under Fire," September 
13, 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm/.  
261 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, "Japan's U.S.-Toeing Attitude Hit," March 30, 2004, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm/.  
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD 
6.1. Conclusion 
Proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials to and from 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern certainly poses great threats to the 
world.  Thus, preventing the flow of WMD has been continuing efforts for the 
global community to maintain international peace and security.  It is especially true 
for the United States where big scale terrorist attacks were brought about as realities 
on September 11, 2001.  It has also been a top priority agenda among the states in 
East Asia where one of the “proliferation concern states” is located.  
In the meanwhile, the So San incident clearly demonstrated that existing 
regimes did not have enough capabilities to hamper the proliferation of WMD and 
related materials.  The PSI, announced in May 2003, in Krakow, Poland, with the 
commitments of 11 countries, was the answer that the United States and like-minded 
countries had sought in order to break through the situation.  The PSI is a 
multilateral effort that aims to interdicting the shipments of WMD and related 
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.  The PSI 
activities involve, inter alia, information sharing and interdiction exercises among 
the participants.  More than 30 interdiction exercises have been conducted since 
2003 to promote international cooperation and capacity building to prevent 
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trafficking of WMD and related materials (See Appendix C).262  The exercises also 
contain clear and strong message to proliferators that PSI members are committed to 
making cooperative effort to prevent proliferation of WMD.263 
The PSI is said to be an “activity” rather than an organization.  It has no 
headquarters, secretariat, and budget.  The cooperation that will be expected for the 
activities is on an ad hoc basis.  This flexibility is considered to be one of the 
reasons that understanding of the initiative widely spread since its interception.  On 
May 28, 2008, representatives of more than 80 countries, including non-participating 
states to the initiative such as China, India, and Pakistan, gathered in the PSI fifth 
anniversary senior-level meeting, held in Washington D.C., the United States.264  
The number of the participants to the initiative has increased since its interception 
and as of May 28, 2008, 91 countries have participated in the initiative (See 
Appendix B).265  
 This dissertation has attempted to provide a critical review of the PSI and 
addressed its incompatibilities with UNCLOS.  For example, under UNCLOS 
vessels of all states are given the “right of innocent passage” in the territorial sea and 
the coastal state cannot infringe the innocent passage unless the passage is prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal states.  Transportation of WMD 
                                                 
262 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, "United States to Host Fifth Anniversary 
Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting; National Security Advisor Steve Hadley to 
Providekeynote Address," May 22, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/200/may/105147.htm. 
263 Ibid. 
264 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Washington Declaration for PSI 5th 
Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting," May 28, 2008, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/105268.htm.; See also Wade Boese, "Interdiction 
Initiative Successes Assessed," Arms Control Today  (July/August 2008). 
http://www.armscontrol.org/. 
265 Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, note 57 above.  
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and related materials, however, does not constitute criteria that are prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the costal states under Article 19(2).  Moreover, on 
the high seas, vessels are given the “freedom of navigation.”  States may conduct a 
“right of visit” to a vessel if the vessel is reasonably suspected engaging in the 
activities provided under Article 110.  However, again, the conditions given in it do 
not include transportation of WMD and related materials.  Further, flag states are 
guaranteed its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, thus, PSI participants are not 
allowed to take measures against a vessel without consent of the flag state on the 
high sea.  These PSI’s incompatibilities with UNCLOS made several countries, 
such as China, remain outside the initiative.  In order to overcome these dilemmas, 
the United States has been concluding boarding agreements with the major flags of 
registry countries.  
 This dissertation has also conducted a review of two 2005 SUA Protocols in 
relation to the PSI. It has demonstrated the 2005 SUA Protocols will strengthen the 
worldwide trend of counter-terrorism and it will also greatly enhance the PSI’s 
legitimacy.  As examined in this research, newly developed Protocols have 
criminalized transportation of WMD and related materials under Article 3bis(b) 
although there is a condition that the person should “unlawfully and intentionally” 
commit the offence under the Article.  Moreover, under Article 8bis, states are given 
strong legal basis to stop, search, and seize WMD and related materials on board a 
foreign flagged vessel on the high seas if the flag state authorizes them to do so.  
Upon entering into force, the PSI participants will finally acquire their legal 
foundation for the interdiction operations.  Nevertheless, it seems to take years for 
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its entry into force.  As of June 6, 2008, six states have signed the 2005 Protocol to 
the SUA Convention, however, none of them are operative.  The slow ratification 
pace of the 2005 SUA Protocols is another reason why the United States has been 
consistently proceeding the boarding agreements with the major flags of registry 
countries.  Boarding agreements likely allow more dynamic PSI operations beyond 
the 2005 SUA Protocols. 
 Moreover, responses towards the PSI in the East Asian region are carefully 
reviewed in this dissertation.  It has demonstrated that, given its delicate situation in 
the region, not all the countries are willing to participate in the initiative, although 
they share the same concern towards the proliferation of WMD and related materials.  
While Russia finally agreed to join the initiative, it still holds its concern about the 
legality of the initiative.  China and South Korea remain outside of the initiative 
although they seem to join intelligence sharing for non-proliferation of WMD in 
general.  China has also been expressing its concern about the legitimacy of the 
initiative.  It seems only Japan has been actively engaging in the initiative as can be 
seen in their outreach activities such as ASTOP that aims to strengthen efforts and 
increase awareness towards non-proliferation of WMD and related materials in 
Asia-Pacific region.  On the contrary, North Korea has been strongly against the 
initiative since its interception.  It is noted that the PSI would lead the U.S.-North 
Korea relations to an “explosive phase.”   
 It is hoped that the examination conducted herein will be useful for 
understanding the initiative; controversial legal issue under UNCLOS; implication of 
the 2005 SUA Protocols in the PSI perspective; and the reaction of the East Asian 
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countries towards the initiative.  It is further hoped that this dissertation would help 
administrators or policy-makers making a non-proliferation policy.  It is recognized 
that the current structure of the PSI entails several shortcomings and, thus, it is 
difficult to acquire global support.  Without global understandings, the effectiveness 
of the initiative would certainly be limited.  However, this does not mean that the 
idea of the PSI is wrong.  On the contrary, such kind of non-proliferation regime is 
under a growing demand in the worldwide trend of counter-terrorism to maintain 
international peace and security.  The PSI still has its potential to be accepted if the 
participants make necessary modifications to it.   
To end this dissertation, the following suggestions are presented, hoping the 
PSI to be a full-fledged regime so that it will be able to contribute toward 
international peace and security. 
 
6.2. The way forward   
6.2.1. Establishing a formal organization  
As stated above, the notion of the PSI is maintained by its characteristic as 
an “activity” rather than an organization.  As such, if interdiction operation is 
considered, supporters of the PSI will be able to engage in it depending on their own 
“willingness” and take preferable measures according to their political situation at 
that time.  This flexibility can be considered as an advantage of the PSI and it will 
allow involving states speedy decision making and shifting to interdiction operations 
promptly.  Moreover, this flexibility is considered to be one of the reasons that led 
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Russia to participate in the PSI although their commitment is still doubtful.266  It has 
finally got understandings from China and South Korea although they are not 
considered as participants in the initiative, and they are also expected to be involved 
with respect to information sharing.  Considering the delicate situation in East Asia, 
the flexibility of the PSI seems to fit into the region. 
 However, as has been noted above, it is doubtful whether concerned 
countries will be willing to exchange information under its informal structure.  This 
concern may undermine the basis of the PSI activities where it aims to hamper illicit 
trafficking of WMD based on intelligence from its supporters.  Moreover, the lack 
of formal organization would increase the risks of conflict in interdiction operation 
and raise unnecessary questions. 267   What constitutes “states of proliferation 
concern”?  What kind of related materials would cause threats, especially if they are 
dual-use?  How and who would command the case, bearing such uncertainties?  
Further, as long as it does not have a formal body and budget, its status will always 
remain vulnerable as governments’ policy changes, the governments’ priority for 
non-proliferation and their view for the PSI would change.268  
 In order to overcome such concerns, the PSI must be established under a 
formal mechanism where a budget is provided and regular intelligence sharing 
among all participants would be conducted.  This will strengthen the validity of the 
intelligence and enhance the sustainability of the PSI. Valencia notes that it should be 
brought into the UN auspices as it is advocated in an Act that was approved in House 
                                                 
266 Prosser and Scoville, note 157 above.  
267 Garvey, note 88 above, at 137.  
268 See Richard Bond, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Three Years On," BASIC NOTES  
(2006). http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060802.pdf. 
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of Representatives in the United States.269  However, as Joseph notes, Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would be a reasonable model for the PSI, 
where the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out point-of-contact functions, 
including distribution of working papers to members and hosting of monthly experts 
meetings.270  Unlike putting it under UN system, it will be able to keep its 
“flexibility” and provide better communication channel among participants.  By 
formalizing the initiative and following to the MTCR as its model, the PSI would 
increase its credibility and sustainability as a non-proliferation regime. 
 
6.2.2. Strengthening the legality of the PSI operation 
Both Russia’s initial hesitation to join the initiative and China’s current 
status to remain outside of the PSI is due to the lack of its operational legality.  As 
previously discussed, the new 2005 SUA Protocols will provide strong legal basis for 
interdiction operation.  The Protocols criminalize transportation of WMD and the 
related materials; moreover, states are given legal basis to stop, search, and seize the 
illicit cargos on board a foreign flagged vessel on the high seas if the flag state 
authorizes them to do so.  Accordingly, states are strongly encouraged to sign and 
                                                 
269 Valencia, note 1 above, at 74, and note 159 above. See also Valencia, "Put the PSI under the 
UN," Global Asia 3, no. 2 (2008), 46. http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue6/v3n2_valencia.pdf.  The 
Act notes that the President should strive to expand and strengthen the PSI by “[w]orking with 
the United Nations Security Council to develop a resolution to authorize the PSI under 
international law.”  It also requires the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to submit 
a defined budget for the PSI.  See “Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act 
of 2007,” Section 1221, “Proliferation Security Initiative Improvements and Authorities,” 1st 
Session, 100th Congress. 
270 Joseph, note 46 above.; Gahlaut also notes that the PSI shares common characteristics with 
other multilateral export control regimes – the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG).  See Seema Gahlaut, "The 
PSI Will Parallel the Multilateral Export Control Regimes," The Monitor 10, no. 1 (2004). 
http://www.uga.edu/cits/.. 
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ratify the two SUA Protocols to enhance its effectiveness.  However, it may not be a 
short-term solution, considering its pessimistic views for entering into force as 
previously discussed.  That is why the United States has been signing bilateral 
agreements with major flag of registry countries, so that they can interdict WMD and 
the related materials legitimately under the consent of flag state.  Nevertheless, it 
does receive criticisms.  As the number of participants grows, “they may be able to 
bend international law, but they cannot rewrite it.” 271   However, bending 
international law will lead other states to justify their aggressive action.272 
The issue of legality is a root obstacle that has to be overcome.  To solve 
this problem, the PSI participants should consider introducing a UN Security Council 
resolution that will authorize the interdiction of suspected WMD in international 
waters.  The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has been introduced to request 
all states “to take cooperative action” to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD and the 
related materials.  However, it does not provide any new legal authority to carry out 
interdiction operation.  The PSI supporters need to develop a UN Security Council 
resolution that will go beyond the Resolution 1540 and will authorize interdiction of 
WMD and the related materials.273  Under Article 42 of Chapter VII of Charter of 
the United Nations, Security Council may “take such action by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or resort international peace and security.”274  
                                                 
271 Friedman, note 3 above, at 8.  
272 Ibid. 
273 Michael Becker, "The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the 
Interdiction of Ships at Sea," Harvard International Law Journal 46, no. 1 (2005), 219. 
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/.  On the contrary, Lehrman suggests that PSI participants sign ship 
boarding agreements to ensure the resolution’s enforcement.  See Lehrman, note 157 above, at 
24. 
274 Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
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Clear authorization of interdiction operation under the resolution, including use of 
armed force, would strongly enhance the PSI activities.275  The European Union 
(EU) is also considering interdiction operation that includes use of force.  Paragraph 
4 of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction states, “When these measures (including political dialogue and 
diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of 
shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned.”276  
 
6.2.3. Expanding the outreach activities  
The PSI needs to strengthen its outreach efforts to gain global supports so 
that its effectiveness would be enhanced.  The participants at the PSI meeting held 
in Lisbon, Portugal, in 2004 also agreed that “it was essential to continue broadening 
the international consensus” which would be carried out by building on outreach 
activities.277  China is a key country in East Asia, considering its geographical 
location and relationship with North Korea, to hamper the illicit proliferation of 
WMD, delivery system, and the related materials.  Thus, every effort to gain 
China’s participation should be continued.  
                                                                                                                                          
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 41. 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm. 
275 See Joyner for the argument surrounding the issue of getting authority for the PSI operation 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Daniel H. Joyner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: 
Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law," The Yale Jounal of International 
Law 30 (2005), 18. 
276 European Union, Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, paragraph 4.  
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76328.pdf. 
277 Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 58 above.  
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Moreover, it is evidenced that North Korea has been exchanging technology 
and resources with countries in South Asia and the Middle East, 278  where 
transportation between these regions is most likely conducted through the Malacca 
Straits.  Accordingly, cooperation among South East Asian countries is also 
essential to improve interdiction capability.  Singapore has participated in various 
PSI exercises since December 2003 and officially joined the PSI since March 
2004.279  It has also hosted PSI exercise “DEEP SABRE” in August 2005.  On the 
contrary, Indonesia and Malaysia are not joining the initiative.  Nevertheless, both 
of them are members of the ASEAN280 and participating ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF)281 where WMD proliferation is always one of the top regional security 
agenda.  For example, the Chairman’s Statement of the thirteenth ARF, which was 
held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in July 2006, noted that “[t]he Ministers stated that 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, 
including potentially to terrorists, remained a serious security challenge” and the 
Ministers expressed their support for the implementation of the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540.  Although Indonesia and Malaysia are not joining the initiative, 
they share the concern for proliferation of WMD.  
                                                 
278 Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and 
Pakistan," CRS Report for Congress  (2004). 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/30781.pdf 
279 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, "Remarks by Chan Heng Chee, Ambassador of 
Singapore, at the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Second Anniversary Event Department of 
State, May 31, 2005,"  http://app.mfa.gov.sg/home/index.asp. 
280 Members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See ASEAN website: 
http://www.aseansec.org. 
281 Current participants in the ARF is 10 ASEAN states plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, 
China, European Union, India, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Timor Leste, and the 
United States. See ARF website: http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/. 
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When expanding the PSI outreach, Japan has been playing an important role 
not only in East Asia but also whole Asian region.  As previously touched upon, 
Japan has been hosting ASTOP since 2003 to strengthen efforts for the 
non-proliferation in Asia where issues of the PSI are also discussed.  Moreover, it 
has been emphasizing cooperation in non-proliferation of WMD among states at 
Japan-ASEAN summit. 282   By enhancing the cooperation among states and 
expanding the outreach activity to acquire global supports, the effectiveness of the 
initiative will increase which will lead to achieving international peace and security.   
 
 
                                                 
282  See, for example, “Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN 
Partnership in the New Millennium,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A  The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of 
Interdiction Principles (SOP)  
 (Adopted in Paris, September 4, 2003) 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge 
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery 
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the 
international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing 
treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN 
Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the 
proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and 
underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is 
also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, 
establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants 
are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall 
into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of 
these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI 
seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and 
the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the 
air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, 
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ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive 
efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation 
norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the 
international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on 
measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the 
following set of "Interdiction Principles."  
 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a 
more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of 
WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and 
non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities 
and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. 
They call on all states concerned with this threat to, international peace and security 
to join in similarly committing to: 
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for 
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States 
or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries 
or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to 
interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) 
efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and 
associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or 
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facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.  
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information 
concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character 
of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, 
dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and 
capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction 
efforts.  
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where 
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when 
necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to 
support these commitments.  
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of 
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national 
legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international 
law and frameworks, to include: 
a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from 
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any 
persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so. 
b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another 
state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their 
internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any 
other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or 
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such 
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cargoes that are identified.  
c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances 
to the boarding an searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to 
the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be 
identified by such states.  
d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, 
territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are 
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state 
actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; 
and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, 
internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying 
such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, 
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry. 
e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another 
state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that 
are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes 
that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying 
such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.  
f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points 
for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport 
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes 
117 
that are identified.  
 
 
Source: The White House. “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of 
Interdiction Principles.” September 4, 2003. 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm. 
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Appendix B  The List of Proliferation Security Initiative 
Participants 
 
Afghanistan Djibouti Liberia Romania 
Albania  El Salvador Libya Russia 
Andorra Estonia  Liechtenstein Samoa 
Angola Fiji Lithuania Saudi Arabia 
Argentina Finland Luxembourg Serbia 
Armenia France Macedonia Singapore 
Australia Georgia Malta Slovakia 
Austria Germany Marshall Islands Slovenia 
Azerbaijan Greece Moldova Spain 
Bahrain Holy See Mongolia Sri Lanka 
Belarus Honduras Montenegro Sweden 
Belgium Hungary Morocco Switzerland 
Belize Iceland The Netherlands Tajikistan 
Bosnia Iraq New Zealand Tunisia 
Brunei Darussalam Ireland Norway Turkey 
Bulgaria Israel Oman Turkmenistan 
Cambodia Italy Panama Ukraine 
Canada Japan Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates 
Chile Jordan Paraguay United Kingdom 
Croatia Kazakhstan Philippines United States 
Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Poland Uzbekistan 
Czech Republic Kuwait Portugal Yemen 
Denmark Latvia Qatar   
  Current as of May 22, 2008 
 
Source: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of 
State. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm 
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Appendix C  Proliferation Security Initiative Meetings and 
Exercises 
 
1. PSI Meetings and Exercises in 2008 and Upcoming Events 
PSI Meetings and Exercises in 2008 and Upcoming Events  
Date Place 
Feb 4-6 Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, London, UK 
Mar. 10-12 Exercise Guistir 08: Djibouti and France-hosted maritime / port 
interdiction exercise. Key participants: Red Sea and Maghreb 
countries 
Apr. 8-22 Exercise Phoenix Express 08: U.S. led maritime interoperability 
exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. Maritime interdiction PSI 
scenario injects included 
May 12-14 Exercise Adriatic Shield 08: Croatia hosted maritime / port 
interdiction exercise. Key participants: Adriatic Sea countries, 
Poland, and the U.S. 
May 28-29 5th Year PSI Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC 
Aug. 11-22 Exercise PANAMAX 08: US hosted. Maritime PSI Scenario 
Inject 
Sept. 15-19 Exercise MARU 07: Auckland, New Zealand hosted PSI exercise
2008 
Sept. 24-26 Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, Paris, France 
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 Exercise Trade Winds: US SOUTHCOM US/Caribbean Sea 
LIVEX with maritime interdiction PSI scenario injects 
 Exercise Phoenix Express US EUCOM led maritime 
interoperability exercise in the Mediterranean Sea with maritime 
interdiction PSI scenario injects 
 Exercise Trade Winds: US SOUTHCOM US/Caribbean Sea 
LIVEX with PSI scenario injects 
 Singapore-led PSI exercise in Asia-Pacific 
2009 
 Exercise LEADING EDGE: U.S. hosted exercise (Persian Gulf) 
 
2. PSI Operational Experts Meetings (2003-2007) 
PSI Operational Experts Meetings (2003-2007) 
  Date Place 
No. of 
meetings 
per year 
July 9-10 Operational Experts Meeting, Brisbane, 
Australia 
July 30 Operational Experts Meeting, London, United 
Kingdom 
Sept. 3-4 Operational Experts Meeting, Paris, France 
2003 
Oct. 8-10 Operational Experts Meeting, London, United 
Kingdom  
5 
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Dec. 16-17 Operational Experts Meeting, Washington, DC, 
United States 
Apr. 16-17 Operational Experts Meeting, Ottawa, Canada 
Aug. 3-4 Shipping Container Security Workshop, 
Copenhagen, Denmark  
Aug. 5-6 Operational Experts Meeting, Oslo, Norway 
2004 
Nov. 30- 
 Dec. 2 
Operational Experts Meeting, Sydney, Australia 
4 
Mar. 21-22 Operational Experts Meeting, Omaha, 
Nebraska, United States  
July 6-7 Operational Experts Meeting, Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
Sept. 14-15 Air Cargo Industry Workshop, Los Angeles, 
California, United States 
2005 
Nov. 24-26 Regional Operational Experts Group Meeting, 
Hamburg, Germany 
4 
Apr. 11-12 Operational Experts Meeting, Miami, Florida, 
United States 
July 25-26 Operational Experts Meeting, Singapore 
Sept. 25-26 Maritime Industry Workshop, London, U.K. 
2006 
Dec. 5-7 Operational Experts Meeting, Montreal, Canada 
4 
2007 Jan. 
31-Feb .1 
Proliferation Finance Workshop, Washington, 
DC, United States 
3 
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Mar. 26-28 Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, 
Auckland, New Zealand 
Oct. 2-4 Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, 
Rhodes, Greece 
 
3. PSI Exercises (2003-2007) 
PSI Exercises (2003-2007) 
Date Place 
No. of 
exercises 
per year
Sept. 10-13 Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR: Australia-led 
maritime exercise conducted in the Coral Sea  
Oct. 8-10 Air CPX: United Kingdom-led air interception 
command post (tabletop) exercise conducted in 
London, United Kingdom 
Oct. 13-17 Exercise SANSO '03: Spain-led maritime exercise 
conducted in the Western Mediterranean  
2003 
Nov. 25-27 Exercise BASILIC '03: France-led maritime 
exercise conducted in the Western Mediterranean  
4 
2004 Jan. 11-17 Exercise SEA SABER: United States-led maritime 
exercise conducted in the Arabian Sea, United 
States 
9 
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Feb. 19 Exercise AIR BRAKE '03: Italian-led air 
interception exercise conducted over Italy (Trapani) 
Mar. 31-Apr. 1 Exercise HAWKEYE: Germany-led customs 
exercise conducted in Germany (Frankfurt Airport)  
Apr. 19-22 Exercise CLEVER SENTINEL: Italy-led maritime 
exercise conducted in the Mediterranean  
Apr. 19-21 Exercise SAFE BORDERS: Poland-led ground 
interdiction exercise conducted in Poland (vicinity 
Wroclaw)  
June 23-24 Exercise APSE '04: France-led simulated air 
interception exercise  
Sept.27-Oct. 1 PSI Gaming Exercise: United States-hosted exercise 
at Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 
Oct. 25-27 Exercise TEAM SAMURAI '04: Japan-led maritime 
interdiction exercise 
Nov. 8-18 Exercise CHOKEPOINT '04: United States-led 
maritime interdiction exercise 
Apr. 8-15 Exercise NINFA '05: Portugal-led maritime/ground 
interdiction exercise 
2005 
June 1-2 Exercise BOHEMIAN GUARD '05: Czech 
Republic- and Poland-led regional ground 
interdiction exercise  
6 
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June 7-8 Exercise BLUE ACTION '05: Spain-led air/ground 
interdiction exercise 
Aug. 15-19 Exercise DEEP SABRE: Singapore-led 
maritime/ground interdiction exercise 
Oct. 3-7 PSI Air Gaming Exercise: Norwegian-hosted 
exercise at Norwegian Naval Academy, Bergen, 
Norway 
Nov. 14-19 Exercise EXPLORING THEMIS: United 
Kingdom-hosted maritime/CPX interdiction 
exercise 
Apr. 4-5 Exercise TOP PORT: Netherlands-hosted maritime / 
CPX interdiction exercise 
Apr. 4-6 Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR '06: 
Australia-hosted Air / CPX interdiction exercise 
May 24-26 Exercise ANATOLIAN SUN: Turkey-hosted 
combined air, land and sea CPX and LIVEX 
interdiction exercise 
June 21-22 Exercise HADES '06: French-hosted air interdiction 
exercise  
2006 
Sept. 13-15 Exercise AMBER SUNRISE: Poland-hosted with 
Denmark, Russia and Sweden maritime/ground 
exercise 
6 
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Oct. 10-31 Exercise LEADING EDGE: U.S. hosted CPX and 
maritime/ground interdiction exercise (Persian 
Gulf) 
Apr. 26-27 Exercise SMART RAVEN: Lithuania hosted air 
interdiction exercise (Key participants: Estonia, 
Latvia and Poland) 
May 27-29 Exercise ADRIATIC GATE: Slovenia hosted 
ground/port interdiction exercise 
June 18-22 PSI Gaming Exercise: United States-hosted exercise 
at Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 
Aug.29-Sept.7 Exercise PANAMAX 07: US hosted. Maritime PSI 
Scenario Inject 
Oct. 12-15 Exercise Pacific Shield 07: Japan hosted PSI 
maritime/port interdiction exercise 
2007 
Oct. 29-31 Exercise Eastern Shield 07: Ukraine hosted 
combined air, ground, and sea interdiction exercise 
(Key participants: Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, 
Moldova and Poland 
6 
 
Source: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of 
State. “Calendar of Events.” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12684.htm. 
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Appendix D  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005 
(2005 SUA Convention) (extract) 
(Consolidated text of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation and of the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention) 
 
Article 1 
.… 
(d)  BCN weapon means: 
(i) “biological weapons”, which are: 
(1)  microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or 
(2)  weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents 
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
(ii)  “chemical weapons”, which are, together or separately: 
(1)  toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for: 
(A)  industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other 
peaceful purposes; or 
(B)  protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to 
protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against 
chemical weapons; or 
(C)  military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons 
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and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals 
as a method of warfare; or 
(D)  law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes, 
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; 
(2) munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other 
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in 
subparagraph (ii)(1), which would be released as a result of the 
employment of such munitions and devices; 
(3) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with 
the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph 
(ii)(2). 
(iii)  “nuclear weapons” and other “nuclear explosive devices”. 
…. 
Article 2 
1 This Convention does not apply to: 
(a) a warship; or 
(b) a ship owned or operated by a State when being used as a naval auxiliary or 
for customs or police purposes; or 
(c) a ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid up. 
2 Nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other 
Government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. 
 
Article 2bis 
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…. 
3 Nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
Washington, London and Moscow on 1 July 1968, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, 
London and Moscow on 10 April 1972, or the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction, done at Paris on 13 January 1993, of States Parties to such 
treaties. 
…. 
Article 3bis 
1 Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act: 
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship any explosive, 
radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to 
cause death or serious injury or damage; or 
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or 
noxious substance, which is not covered by subparagraph (a)(i), in such 
quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious 
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injury or damage; or 
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; or 
(iv) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national 
law, to commit an offence set forth in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii) or (iii); or 
(b) transports on board a ship: 
(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be 
used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as is 
provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the 
purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; or 
(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as defined in article 1; 
or 
(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material 
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a 
nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under 
safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; or 
(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related technology that 
significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN 
weapon, with the intention that it will be used for such purpose. 
2 It shall not be an offence within the meaning of this Convention to transport an 
item or material covered by paragraph 1(b)(iii) or, insofar as it relates to a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device, paragraph 1(b)(iv), if such item or 
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material is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported under 
the control of, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons where: 
(a) the resulting transfer or receipt, including internal to a State, of the item or 
material is not contrary to such State Party's obligations under the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and,  
(b) if the item or material is intended for the delivery system of a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a State Party to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the holding of such weapon or 
device is not contrary to that State Party’s obligations under that Treaty. 
 
Article 3ter 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person 
unlawfully and intentionally transports another person on board a ship knowing that 
the person has committed an act that constitutes an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis 
or 3quater or an offence set forth in any treaty listed in the Annex, and intending to 
assist that person to evade criminal prosecution. 
 
Article 3quater 
Any person also commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person: 
(a) unlawfully and intentionally injures or kills any person in connection with 
the commission of any of the offences set forth in article 3, paragraph 1, 
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article 3bis, or article 3ter; or 
(b) attempts to commit an offence set forth in article 3, paragraph 1, article 3bis, 
paragraph 1(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) , or subparagraph (a) of this article; or 
(c) participates as an accomplice in an offence set forth in article 3, article 3bis, 
article 3ter, or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or 
(d) organizes or directs others to commit an offence set forth in article 3, article 
3bis, article 3ter, or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or 
(e) contributes to the commission of one or more offences set forth in article 3, 
article 3bis, article 3ter or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article, by a group 
of persons acting with a common purpose, intentionally and either: 
(i) with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an 
offence set forth in article 3, 3bis or 3ter; or 
(ii) in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence set 
forth in article 3, 3bis or 3ter. 
…. 
Article 5 
Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those 
offences. 
 
Article 5bis 
1 Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the 
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necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized 
under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for management or 
control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in 
this Convention. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative. 
2 Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals 
having committed the offences. 
3 Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance 
with paragraph 1 are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, 
civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions. 
…. 
Article 8 
1 The master of a ship of a State Party (the “flag State”) may deliver to the 
authorities of any other State Party (the “receiving State”) any person who the master 
has reasonable grounds to believe has committed an offence set forth in article 3, 
3bis, 3ter, or 3quater. 
…. 
Article 8bis 
1 States Parties shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress 
unlawful acts covered by this Convention, in conformity with international law, 
and shall respond to requests pursuant to this article as expeditiously as possible.  
…. 
4 A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence set forth in 
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed 
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involving a ship flying its flag, may request the assistance of other States Parties in 
preventing or suppressing that offence. The States Parties so requested shall use 
their best endeavours to render such assistance within the means available to them. 
5 Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a State Party (“the 
requesting Party”) encounter a ship flying the flag or displaying marks of registry 
of another State Party (“the first Party”) located seaward of any State’s territorial 
sea, and the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a 
person on board the ship has been, is or is about to be involved in the commission 
of an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, and the requesting Party 
desires to board, 
(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that the first Party 
confirm the claim of nationality, and  
(b) if nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask the first Party 
(hereinafter referred to as “the flag State”) for authorization to board and to 
take appropriate measures with regard to that ship which may include 
stopping, boarding and searching the ship, its cargo and persons on board, 
and questioning the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set 
forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be 
committed, and 
(c) the flag State shall either: 
(i) authorize the requesting Party to board and to take appropriate measures 
set out in subparagraph (b), subject to any conditions it may impose in 
accordance with paragraph 7; or  
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(ii) conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or other 
officials; or 
(iii) conduct the boarding and search together with the requesting Party, 
subject to any conditions it may impose in accordance with paragraph 7; 
or 
(iv) decline to authorize a boarding and search. 
The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in 
subparagraph (b) without the express authorization of the flag State. 
(d) Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General that, with respect to 
ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, the requesting Party is 
granted authorization to board and search the ship, its cargo and persons on 
board, and to question the persons on board in order to locate and examine 
documentation of its nationality and determine if an offence set forth in 
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed, 
if there is no response from the first Party within our hours of 
acknowledgement of receipt of a request to confirm nationality. 
(e) Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General that, with respect to 
ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, the requesting Party is 
authorized to board and search a ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to 
question the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set forth in 
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed. 
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The notifications made pursuant to this paragraph can be withdrawn at any time. 
 
6 When evidence of conduct described in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater is found as 
the result of any boarding conducted pursuant to this article, the flag State may 
authorize the requesting Party to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board 
pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag State. The requesting 
Party shall promptly inform the flag State of the results of a boarding, search, and 
detention conducted pursuant to this article. The requesting Party shall also 
promptly inform the flag State of the discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that 
is not subject to this Convention. 
7 The flag State, consistent with the other provisions of this Convention, may 
subject its authorization under paragraph 5 or 6 to conditions, including obtaining 
additional information from the requesting Party, and conditions relating to 
responsibility for and the extent of measures to be taken. No additional measures 
may be taken without the express authorization of the flag State, except when 
necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or where those 
measures derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.  
8 For all boardings pursuant to this article, the flag State has the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items and persons on board, 
including seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution. However, the flag State may, 
subject to its constitution and laws, consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
another State having jurisdiction under article 6. 
 
